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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
THE EU AS A SECURITY ACTOR IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF MALI 
 
 
 
RASHEED IBRAHIM 
 
EUROPEAN STUDIES M.A. THESIS, JULY 2019 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. SENEM AYDIN DÜZGİT 
 
 
Keywords: CFSP, EU, Security, Africa, Mali 
 
 
During the Cold War era, EU’s global role was mostly limited to trade and environmental 
policies. The establishment of the CFSP meant that the EU could now become an independent 
security actor in world politics. One of the regions in which the EU has asserted this new role 
of global security actorness is Sub-Sahara Africa where about 50% of CFSP operation have 
been carried or ongoing. Sub-Sahara Africa is important for the EU for both economic and 
security purposes. The region serves as a source of raw materials for the EU. Additionally, it 
is home to terrorist groups such as AQIM, Boko Haram, that can inspire terrorist attacks to 
European countries. These factors have contributed to the EU asserting more roles as a security 
actor in the region. This thesis aims to answer the question of the extent to which the EU is an 
effective security actor in Africa, with a focus on Sahel Mali. While literature on EU operations 
has assessed EU's effectiveness from several dimensions including cohesion, autonomy, 
authority, recognition, presence, and capabilities, this thesis assesses the effectiveness of EU 
as a security actor in Africa based on cohesion. Cohesion serves as the most appropriate 
dimension as it also paves the way for the other dimensions.   
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
AB'NIN AFRIKA'DA GÜVENLIK AKTÖRÜ OLARAK VARLIĞI: SAHIL MALI 
ÖRNEĞI 
 
 
 
RASHEED IBRAHIM 
 
AVRUPA ÇALIŞMALARI YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2019 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. SENEM AYDIN DÜZGİT 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: ODGP, AB, Güvenlik, Afrika, Mali 
 
 
Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası, Avrupa Birliği’nin küresel bir aktör olarak oynadığı rolü 
tümüyle değiştirdi. Soğuk Savaş döneminde ağırlıklı olarak ticaret ve çevre politikalarıyla 
sınırlı olan küresel aktörlük, Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası’yla beraber bağımsız bir 
güvenlik aktörlüğüne evrildi. Sahraaltı Afrika ise, Avrupa Birliği’nin bu yeni küresel güvenlik 
aktörlüğünü gösterdiği alanlardan biri olarak karşımıza çıkıyor. Devam eden ve sona ermiş 
ODGP operasyonlarının yaklaşık olarak yarısı Sahraaltı Afrika’da düzenlendi. Bölge, AB 
ülkelerine hammadde sağlaması nedeniyle ekonomik önem arz ediyor. Aynı zamanda, Boko 
Haram ve El-Kaide gibi terörist organizasyonların yerleşkesi konumundaki bölge, AB 
ülkelerinde güvenlik endişeleri yaratıyor. AB’nin Sahraaltı Afrika’da kendisini bir güvenlik 
aktörü olarak tesis etmesinin temelinde bu iki sebep yatıyor. Bu tezde, Sahil Mali örneği odağa 
alınarak AB’nin Afrika’daki güvenlik aktörlüğünün etkililiğine dair bir değerlendirme 
yapılmıştır. Mevcut literatür, AB’nin etkililiğini tutarlılık, nüfuz, tanıma, varlık gösterme, 
imkan ve yetenek ölçütleriyle ele almıştır. Bu çalışma, AB’nin Afrika’daki güvenlik 
aktörlüğünü tutarlılık açısından ele alarak etkililiği değerlendirmekte ve tutarlılığın diğer 
boyutlar için hazırladığı zemine dair bir tartışma sunmaktadır. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Up until the fall of the Berlin wall and reunification of Germany, which symbolized the 
end of the Soviet Union, Western Europe had relied significantly on US in keeping its 
security. However, two crises that happened in the decade following the dissipation of 
the Soviet Union alarmed Europe to rethink its role in regional and global security. Europe 
realized how incapacitated it was during the Balkan wars which had threatened the peace 
in the region. What’s more, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, effectively annexing it to Iraq, 
demonstrated that Europe had new security problems to deal with and it could not always 
rely on the United States to keep the borders of Europe safe. Even if it wanted to, the 
implication would be that Europe shall forever be under the shadow of the United States.  
 
Literature on the kind of actor the EU is in global affairs predates the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, hence the Kosovan war and the Gulf war. Earlier research has defined the Union as 
a Civilian power (Duchene 1973) to depict the EU as an actor that resorts to the use of 
non-military means such as trade in realizing its objectives. Other studies have used the 
term normative power (Manners 2002) backed by the argument that the EU exerts 
influence in the international arena via its ability to define acceptable norms and 
behaviour in interstate politics. More important and even more relevant for this study is 
the debate in the literature about whether or not the EU can be considered an actor at all. 
And if it does qualify as an actor, what are the various elements or characteristics that 
make the EU a global actor. On the one hand, scholars such as Duchene (1973), Sjostedt 
(1977), Manners (2002) and Vogler & Bretherton (2006) theorize EU’s global actorness 
under the assumption that the Union has evolved to a stage whereby it could be treated as 
an international actor distinct from its member states. On the other hand, this idea of EU 
as an independent actor in global politics has been challenged by “their realist or English 
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School critics, who emphasized the EU’s limited capacity to act as an independent, let 
alone distinct, power in the international system” (Klose 2018).  
The EU has become an important global and independent actor in several aspects of world 
politics. This thesis aims to analyse empirically and constructively the effectiveness of 
the Union as a global security actor using EU’s MALI EUTM SAHEL operation, a 
military operation (which subsequently was followed by a complementary civilian 
operation) initiated in 2013. This chapter provides a broader view of the study by 
summarizing the trend in the literature, presenting the gap and intended contribution, and 
framing the research question more clearly. Chapter two discusses the historical 
evolvement of the EU as a security actor. Chapter three expands on the theoretical 
framework of this study. Chapter 4 gives an overview of Mali and the 2012 crisis. Chapter 
5 looks at EU-Mali relationship and the involvement of EU in the crisis and chapter 6 
analyses the effectiveness of EU in the crisis.  
 
 
1.1 State of the Literature on EU Actorness 
 
 
Security has always been at the core of the European integration projects. Despite its 
formation as an economic union, the founding fathers also envisioned it as a project that 
will render another all-out war on the continent inconceivable. In essence, the project 
aimed to create a Union of shared and common interests that would prevent the world 
from witnessing a war similar to the two world wars. Regardless of this underlying motive 
of security, the extent to which the EU was an actor of its own in global security affairs 
was questionable. Relying significantly on NATO for its security, EU operated, more or 
less, under the shadow of the United States when it comes to its security actorness.  In the 
immediate aftermath of the Cold War, EU encountered instability in the Balkans that 
threatened the security of the region. This instability was yet the beginning of new threats 
that the EU would have to face in the decades following the eradication of the Russian 
threat. New wars, immigration, and terrorism have proven to be some of the salient issues 
that the EU have had to deal with. 
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In the last couple of decades, the EU has asserted not only a regional role but also an 
international one through its involvement in crisis in other parts of the world such as Mali, 
Afghanistan, Sudan, Congo. As of the year 2019, EU has been involved in crisis in three 
main regions of the world, namely Europe, Asia and Africa which make up approximately 
23%, 20%, and 57% each of total CSDP operations (Mauro, Krotz and Wright 2017). 
Additionally, EU’s role in global environmental crisis have served as empirical evidence 
to support claims that EU has developed into a global actor. Various scholars in the 
literature have studied the leadership roles the EU has played in global environmental 
initiatives (Oberthür and Kelly 2008; Schaik and Schunz 2012). 
 
The paragraph above indicates that the literature on the EU’s global actorness in not new. 
In fact, the literature dates as far back as 1977 when Gunnar Sjöstedt first defined 
actorness as the “capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors 
in the international system” (16). Even though Sjöstedt may have been among the earliest 
scholars to theorise EU’s actorness, the need for EU’s independent global actorness had 
been raised about 15 years before Sjöstedt’s theorization. Walter Hallstein (1962) wrote, 
“One reason for creating the European Community is to enable Europe to play its full part 
in world affairs” and to do so, the Community needed the capability of communicating 
with “one voice” (79). To put this in context, Hallstein, an academic also, served as the 
first president of the European Commission. Hence, this perspective may be seen as a 
merge of institutional (bureaucratic) and academic perspective. Since then, literature on 
the EU’s actorness has evolved immensely with plethora of research and perspectives 
attempting to unravel questions surrounding EU global actorness. 
 
Whether an effective one or not, the European Community was de facto an international 
actor by virtue of the fact that it has been a signatory member to several international 
agreements, especially on global environmental issues as well as trade related issues 
(Oberthür 1999). This research focuses on EU’s global actorness from security standpoint 
using empirical analysis to assess the effectiveness of the Union as a security actor in 
world politics today. While there are many dimensions from which effectiveness may be 
measured, cohesion defined as the “simply as the adoption of determinate common 
policies and the pursuit of those policies by EU Member States and institutions” (Thomas 
2012, 458), provides the best framework to assess the effectiveness of the EU as an actor. 
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Before going on to outline the research question and methodology employed for this study 
in the subsequent parts of this chapter, I shall present a synopsis of some of the crucial 
works done on the EU actorness literature. 
 
Sjöstedt (1977) stemming his definition from the “capacity” to act discussed some 
important factors that determine an actor’s capabilities: a. autonomy and b. independent 
diplomatic capabilities and legal authority (12-19). To assess EU’s actorness, one would 
have to examine the extent to which the Union had autonomy in decision making, 
independent of other actors. From this standpoint then, EU’s massive reliance on NATO 
during the cold war would be a factor that diminished global actorness of the Union in 
security affairs. The latter criteria, diplomatic capacity, is a practical element that 
reinforces the former, autonomy. In order to be truly autonomous, the Union would need 
to depend on its own capabilities so as to smoothen its negotiations without complications 
resulting from reliance on capabilities of other actors. While the EU has succeeded in 
institutionalizing some of its security apparatuses, there remain some limitations 
discussed in the final chapter of this thesis. 
 
Subsequent studies refined Sjostedt’s (1977) theory by polishing his definitions as well 
as including new elements to the criteria of actorness. Two main works have had 
imperative impact in this regard. First, Jupille and Caporaso (1998) advanced Sjostedt’s 
theory by introducing recognition and cohesion as crucial elements that need to be 
considered when evaluating EU actorness. Their work does not aim to debunk Sjostedt’s 
theory, but rather to reinforce it by arguing that autonomy and legal authority do not 
suffice explaining global actorness. Consequently, they posit that recognition, relating to 
the extent to which the international environment (meaning other actors in the world) 
accept an actor’s actorness, and cohesion, referring to the consistency of and harmony of 
the EU’s member state policies, play significant roles in EU global actorness. 
 
The second work to further this theory is Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 2006). Their 
works contributed to the literature on EU actorness by adding three new elements to the 
criteria—presence, opportunity, and capability. Presence as conceptualized by the 
authors refers to the extent to which an actor can impact its external environment, not just 
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purposefully, but rather just by virtue of its existence. This conceptualization of presence 
is derived from an earlier study by Allen and Smith who argue that the notion of presence 
should be defined not in relation to the actor or institutions as “it is not the actor but the 
presence itself which is the more significant phenomenon” (1990, 21). Opportunity as a 
criterion relates to “the external context and events that enable of constrain action[s]” 
(Bretherton and Vogler 2013, 375). In this respect, opportunities are influenced by the 
changing nature of world politics such as the rise and emergence of new actors or the 
waning strength of old actors. Capability as a notion is used broadly by Bretherton and 
Vogler (1999) to encompass all the policy instruments used by the EU as well as its 
internal capacities to formulate policies in its external relations. This conceptualization 
of capabilities differs from Sjostedt’s (1977) in that Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 2006) 
treat legitimation, shared commitment, policy formation (consistency and coherence) all 
part of capability. In essence, all factors related to internal dynamics fall under capability. 
The virtue of this approach lies in it being parsimonious. Nevertheless, the approach used 
in this study, as discussed in chapter 3, treats elements such as consistency and coherence 
as independent of capability as they are broad enough to warrant them being analysed 
independently. In chapter 3, I interact these criteria from the literature and then group 
them into external and internal dimensions. Additionally, elements that overlap with each 
other from different literature are treated and analysed together. 
 
 
1.2 Puzzle in the Literature 
 
 
Following this evolvement of actorness in the literature, a number of studies have 
attempted to analyse the effectiveness of EU’s global actorness using several of these 
established criteria. For instance, several studies have singled out cohesion as an element 
of study to determine the relationship between internal cohesiveness and the effectiveness 
of EU as a global actor (Meunier 2000; Jørgensen, Oberthür and Shahin 2011). A study 
surveying studies in the literature found that EU exhibits more internal coherence when 
acting as a regional actor than as an international actor. Thus, “when acting as a regional 
power, the EU is able to speak with one voice and to succeed in imposing many of its 
norms and principles on neighbouring countries” (Conceicao-Heldt and Meunier 2014, 
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962). On the contrary, exhibiting such coherence in international affairs have often been 
difficult exemplified by its foreign policy making process. 
 
Another study which predates Jupille & Caporaso (1998) and Bretherton and Vogler 
(1999) is Christopher Hill’s (1993) discussions on “capability-expectations gap”. Hill 
(1993) uses this concept to capture the imbalance between the EU’s capacity and its 
global aspirations. The EU nurtures some global aims to which its available resources are 
not able to meet. A more recent study that has investigated the EU’s role in global arena 
concluded that EU’s role in global politics has been diminishing as a result of current 
developments in the international arena. Per the findings of the study, EU continued to 
lose presence in the aftermath of economic crisis in several member states, opportunities 
to exert more global influence, have dwindled in the wake emerging global powers such 
as China and Russia, and lack of internal coherence has diminished the ability of the 
Union to function effectively (Bretherton and Vogler 2013, 386-387). 
 
Considering all the afore-mentioned literature, a puzzle in the literature emerges. On the 
one hand, we observe empirically that the EU is involved in several international 
operations. As a matter of fact, EU has undertaken an overall of 35 CSDP operation 16 
of which are ongoing. On the other hand, the literature suggests that EU’s effectiveness 
in asserting the role of a global actor is regressing. This may be attributed to the trend in 
the literature of the EU’s global actorness which has often been on issues other than 
security. A quick survey of the literature indicates that most of the research pertaining 
EU’s effectiveness as a global actor encompasses issues such as trade, environment, and 
economy. This study aims to reconcile the puzzle emerging from the literature and 
empirical evidence by examining CSDP’s current operation in Sahel as an empirical case 
to understand EU’s operation as a global security actor. 
 
Even though there are some studies that have examined the EU as a global actor in the 
realm of security, not many studies have however used a particular EU operation to 
examine its effectiveness. In essence, most of the literature continue to centre around what 
kind of actor the EU is, or whether or not the EU is a civilian actor, a normative actor, a 
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security actor, and the likes. What seems to be common among various works in this 
literature is that they draw from general evidence to support their claims about EU 
actorness rather than looking at the intricate details of the EU operations to determine the 
effectiveness of the EU.  
 
In other aspects of EU’s global actorness, there have been specific case studies looking 
at involvement of EU in specific global treaty, conference, summit, etc. In environmental 
issues for instance, several studies have examined the union’s global environmental 
actorness looking at specific case studies (Groenleer and Schaik 2007; Delreux 2011). In 
global security actorness on the other hand, earlier case studies analysed the involvement 
of EU in Kosovo dissecting the dynamics to understand EU’s success (Shepherd 2009; 
Greiçevci 2011, Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012). Even though “the Kosovo war acted as 
a decisive catalyst in the development of the EU’s international security role” (Shepherd 
2009, 513), the EU has carried out several civilian and military operations which also 
deserve attention in order to understand the evolvement of EU’s global security actorness 
culture. In fact, the EU under CSDP has carried out 35 civilian and military operations of 
which the operation in Kosovo has garnered the most scholarly attention at the expense 
of the others. Even though CSDP missions have been studied in relation to their 
effectiveness many of the studies either focus on operations in close proximity to the EU. 
This study aims to fill this scholarly gap by examining the involvement of EU in a region 
completely different from its, Africa. Using EU operation in Mali as a case study, I intend 
to evaluate how effective (or ineffective) of an actor the EU has turned to be in terms of 
global security. 
 
From the gap pointed out, it follows that this study aims to contribute to the literature by 
examining how far the EU has come in its global security actorness. In the last decade, 
the EU has asserted more global security roles by involving in regions other than Europe. 
This study adds to the literature on actorness by using an out of area operation to 
determine EU’s global capabilities as well as limitations that it faces when it intervenes 
in regions initially unfamiliar to it and where it does not have much power or control like 
it does in Europe. Essentially, this study aims to extend the studies on EU security from 
the popular trend of studying EU involvement in the Balkans to a more global sphere. 
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This study aims to answer the following questions: To what extent is the EU an effective 
global security actor in Africa? 
 
 
1.3 Scope of the Study 
 
 
The literature review section discussed earlier in this chapter has given a concise survey 
of the literature. The scope of this study has been designed such that it adds up to the 
literature while building on the foundation already built up in the literature, and not just 
a mere repetition of what has already been done. In that regard, this study looks 
specifically at EU security actorness in current global atmosphere. The study covers the 
changing internal dynamics within the EU and how that impacts EU’s actorness at the 
global level. It shall also cover the changing global dynamics such as the rise of new 
actors and how that impacts EU’s global actorness. 
 
The choice of EU’s operation in Sahel Mali for this case study is indeed not a random 
one. Sahel is an area that goes beyond the region of the EU, and at the same time it has 
many characteristics which the EU points out as security threats. The Sahel region has 
been known to harbour terrorists especially Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in Maghreb 
(AQIM) due to its proximity. At the same time, resource scarcity and other environmental 
issues which can become a source of domestic conflicts are among the security issues 
facing the region. Another reason that warrants the selection of Mali as a case study is the 
timing of the operation. The crisis in Mali began to escalate right in the aftermath of the 
Libyan crisis as well as other security crisis in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU. 
Consequently, the EU was more willing to assert the role of a security actor in the crisis 
since it saw the Malian crisis as part of the larger new security threats in the global arena. 
Lastly, the fact that the Malian crisis is ongoing (from 2013 – present) provides an 
interesting dynamic. The EU has passed several resolutions to update the mandate 
whenever it has almost expired, and this helps to study how the EU adopts to changes in 
its ongoing security missions. 
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2 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF EU SECURITY ACTORNESS 
 
 
 
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty transformed the European Community into the European 
Union and also established the security pillar of the EU known as the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). Known currently as the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP), one of the integral parts of the CFSP was the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) whose focus is “comprehensive approach towards crisis 
management, drawing on civilian and military assets” (EEAS 2018). However, the 
security pillar was referred to as a 2nd pillar, which to some extent was independent from 
the first pillar of the Treaty of the European Union. Hence, institutions of the first pillar 
had limited involvement in terms of foreign policy decision making (Müftüler-Baç 2007). 
This pillar system continued until it was abolished by the 2007 Lisbon treaty. The EU 
since Maastricht has adapted two grand strategies to assert and define its global security 
actorness: the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, and the European Union Global 
Strategy (EUGS) in 2016. This chapter provides a historical analysis of the evolution of 
EU security by examining the various milestones and breakthroughs that facilitated it.  
 
Historically, one of the most difficult areas of integration for the EU has been security 
and defence. The first attempt to establish the EDC by former French Prime Minister, 
Rene Pleven between 1950 and 1952, could not be realised because it failed ratification 
by French citizens. The plan proposed by Pleven was an establishment of a joined 
European force consisting of 100,000 military men (CVCE 2016, 2). Following the 
failure of the EDC, the Western European Union was formed as a European military 
alliance institutionally supported by a modified Treaty of Brussels. However, WEU lost 
its significance as NATO developed into the main security alliance of the West 
throughout the Cold War. Today, the EU within the capacity of CSDP carries out several 
military and civilian missions in the world. The question thence follows, how did the EU 
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overcome the practical obstacles to forming a security pillar? Building on the rational 
institutional theory of integration, I argue that by separating the security pillar from the 
EU’s first pillar, the UK and France have been the driving force without which 
implementation of the security pillar would have been impossible.  
 
According to the current literature, various challenges within the EU itself accompanied 
this new pillar. For example, Howorth (2003) pointed out that even though the EU seemed 
to be integrating further by overcoming the plethora of obstacles it had faced, a bigger 
question that remained was about whether the EU aimed to evolve into “a glorified market 
or a world actor” (246). Moreover, expansion of the EU resulting in more member states 
translated into difficulty in reaching consensus on security issues.  Another question 
brought forth by this pillar was the implications of this new role on the relations between 
the EU and US. Despite both the UK and France backing the ESDP, there seemed to be 
diverging perspectives over the motivations behind its formulations. UK saw ESDP as “a 
NATO project with an EU instrument [while France saw it as] an EU project with an 
Atlanticist Instrument” (Howorth 2003, 246). Jacques Chirac advocated for “a United 
Europe of States, not a United States of Europe…[whereas] British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair depicted EU as a superpower but not a superstate” (Deighton 2002, 723). Hence, 
the ESDP in its very core foundation had diverging incentives.  
 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, various scholars from different theoretical standpoints 
predicted the EU-US relation from different perspectives. Realist theories such as 
Mearsheimer (1990) and Walt (1997) expected the EU-US relations to wither away in the 
1990s as their relationship was bound to the existence of a common enemy, Soviet Russia. 
With the disappearance of a common enemy, the defence pact was expected to dissolve. 
From a liberal perspective however, the argument is based on the logic of the EU and US 
having a similar identity, history, political systems and culture, as well as national values. 
Hence, a continuation of the alliance was to be expected (Nye 2000; Sjursen 2004) based 
on their standard characteristics. The establishment of a security pillar, in essence, 
challenged various predictions by scholars of international politics. On one hand it served 
as EU’s step towards walking away from dependence on NATO for its security. On the 
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hand, it also challenged the idea that security was an aspect that was nearly impossible 
for the EU to agree on.  
 
Four years after the Maastricht Treaty came into existence the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty 
amended the Maastricht Treaty in security and many other aspects. The treaty mainly 
sought to take the security pillar a step further by 
 
“resolv(ing) to implement a common foreign and security policy including 
the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a 
common defence in...thereby reinforcing the European identity and its 
independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and 
in the world” (European Communities 1997, 7). 
 
It further transformed the second pillar by paving the way for the involvement of the 
European Commission in CFSP. It made the Presidency the body “responsible for the 
implementation of decisions taken under [CFSP]” and “as well as the one in charge of 
“express[ing] the position of the Union in international organisations and international 
conferences” (European Communities 1997, 13). Additionally, it established the office 
and post of the Secretary-General/High Representative of CFSP and allowed member 
states to abstain rather than veto decisions among many others (Müftüler-Baç 2007). One 
important implication of this dynamic is discussed in some earlier literature that has 
referred to it with several names including “differentiated integration”, “Europe a la 
carte”, “multi-speed Europe”, or “variable geometry” (Dahrendorf 1979; Wallace and 
Ridley 1985; Stubb 1996).  While maintaining the EU as a single market with the four 
freedoms (of movements of goods, services, capital, and people inside the EU) at the heart 
of the integration, member states are able to stay out of policy fields in which they are 
have no interests. This allows the EU to have “common policies where there are common 
interests without any constraint on those who cannot, at a given point of time, join them” 
(Dahrendorf 1979, 20). Other areas of integration where differentiated integration has 
become quite prominent is the Economic and Monetary Union where some states have 
adapted the Euro as their currencies whereas others such as Denmark and the UK decided 
to opt out and stick with their own currencies. Despite the debates in the literature on the 
controversies of conceptualising differentiated integration (Stubb 1996), there is no doubt 
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that allowing member states to opt out of security and defence operations helped moved 
the 2nd pillar one step further from the initial step taken by Maastricht Treaty.  
 
While Amsterdam Treaty took the 2nd pillar one step forward, the 1998 Saint Malo 
agreement took it more than a step further as the UK finally agreed to the EU having its 
own military capability rather than relying on NATO all the time. As mentioned earlier, 
the creation of the ESDP was an initiative supported by both Jacques Chirac and Tony 
Blair, former head of state and head of government of France and UK respectively. So 
unexpected was this initiative that that it has been referred to by some scholars as 
“Europe’s Military Revolution” despite a non-existing EU military force or army 
(Andreani, Bertram and Grant 2001). That can be related to the widely accepted argument 
that “cooperation in security issues and foreign policy making has always been one of the 
hardest areas in the European integration process” (Müftüler-Baç 2007, 4). Additionally, 
such a development seemed politically challenging in an EU split by two factions, 
‘Atlanticists’ and ‘Europeanists’ (Biscop and Andersson 2008), with the Atlanticists –
championed by UK—being in favour of a strong NATO-tied European security system 
and the Europeanists—championed by France—in support of an independent European 
security establishment.  
 
A second reason why this may have been seen as a “revolution” by some scholars may 
be attributed to the unsuccessful historical attempt to build such a framework in 1950 by 
Rene Pleven, the former French Prime Minister. The Pleven Plan which aimed to 
establish a political and defence community in Europe failed to be ratified by the French 
Parliament (Dinan 1999). Despite this historical background which made it seemingly 
impossible, Coelmont (2012) posits that “crafting a fully-fledged strategy need not be an 
impassable obstacle for the Union, because it already possesses all the required building-
blocks” (3). Some scholars argued that the ESDP was an initiative that evolved through 
the history of the EU. Deighton (2002) argued that motivation behind the ESDP was “an 
attempt to define and elaborate what [she called] a strategic space for the EU as a security 
actor, while maintaining its own institutional coherence, efficiency and legitimacy” (720). 
From this argument therefore, one may infer that the CFSP was a way of the EU keeping 
up with the changing nature of international politics. Be that as it may, what really paved 
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way for the EU to emerge and keep up with its changing environment and the international 
atmosphere as a whole was the Saint Malo Agreement between the UK and France. In 
this agreement, both countries signed a document that stipulated that the Union must have 
the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces,” the means to 
decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international rises” 
(Joint Declaration on European Defence 1998). Up until this agreement which resulted 
from informal meetings between France and the UK, prospects of a solely European 
Defence seemed highly impossible (Shearer 2000).  
 
The establishment of the CFSP as a Security pillar by the Maastricht Treaty to some extent 
gave the EU a very limited competency in dealing with security issues. The St Malo 
declaration of 1998 between France and UK gave a little more flesh to the EU Security 
pillar. The first article on the declaration stipulated the agreement between the Head of 
State and Head of Government of France and UK respectively that: 
 
“The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the 
international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union. It will be 
important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam 
provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council 
to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the 
framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an 
intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title 
V of the Treaty of European Union” (Joint Declaration on European Defence 
1998, 2). 
 
The declaration document also stipulated that the EU needed to work in autonomous 
capacity with its own military force. The implications of the St Malo declaration can be 
seen in the evolving nature of the EU to fit into its environment. Series of wars in the 
Balkans, the backyard of the EU, made it more apparent that the Union needed a military 
capacity of its own (Deighton, 726). The EU’s lack of capacity to intervene militarily in 
the ongoing conflicts in its own backyard inevitably served as an incentive and an alarm 
of a sort that it was about time it had developed its own military capacity rather than 
depend on NATO. The Saint Malo agreement while acknowledging the need for the 
military laid the foundation for the 1999 Helsinki Summit. 
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At this summit, member states of the EU agreed to set up framework by 2003 within 
which the EU could launch operations independent of NATO while also recognising the 
UN Security Council as the body in charge of maintaining peace in the world. 
Consequently, the EU’s would-be military capacity would operate in accordance with the 
UN Charter. To be able to achieve this, member states set a headline goal to set up a Rapid 
Reaction Force, military capacity “to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year 
military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg 
tasks” by 2003. This meant that intended EU-led operations would be towards 
peacekeeping, conflict management, crisis intervention and humanitarian intervention. 
Additionally, the conclusions from the summit stipulated that  
 
“new political and military bodies and structures will be established within 
the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and 
strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional 
framework” (Helsinki European Council 1999). 
 
The ESS, the main document that outlined a conceptual framework for the CSFP, was 
adapted by the European Council in December 2003 after Javier Solana, the Secretary 
General/High Representative, was requested to draft it by the Thessalonica Council in the 
summer of that same year. Up until then, there existed no conceptual guidebook to explain 
or define what security (threat) meant. Granted, the Amsterdam Treaty stated 
humanitarian and peacekeeping missions as matters related to European Security. 
However, neither the Maastricht Treaty nor the Amsterdam Treaty had defined clearly 
the security threats facing the EU. Not only did the ESS define the threats facing the 
Union, but it also had a wider perspective that included foreign aid, partnership and 
multilateralism in international politics (Bendiek 2006). 
 
Right after the introduction, the ESS delves into the ‘global challenges and key threats’ 
to the Union. Here, we see the EU securitizing global issues such as poverty, health 
issues—specifically AIDS, hunger, and malnutrition in developing parts of the world. It 
does so by connecting security with economic and social development. By doing so, it 
finds a role for itself as a security actor. In terms of key threats, the ESS identifies 
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Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, 
and organized crime as the major security issues.  In order to understand these elements 
of the ESS, one needs to carefully examine the international environment within which it 
evolved. Considering that the Thessalonica Council demanded drafting of ESS in less 
than a year after the 9/11 attacks, it comes as no surprise that terrorism ranked among the 
security priorities of the Union. Additionally, with the proliferation of WMDs, a major 
concern was the possibility of WMDs or even the technology falling in the hands on these 
terrorist groups.  
 
A common theme that ran across the threats presented in the ESS was the threats to 
society and individuals. It could be observed that the ESS took particular interest in those 
occurrences that seemed to pose direct harm to innocent civilians in non-member state 
countries. In the aftermath of the Cold War, we see interstate conflicts paving way for 
intrastate conflicts. Failed governments in Somalia, Liberia, Afghanistan as well as 
organized crimes like drug and human trafficking were securitized. One thing that the 
aforementioned issues have in common is the threat to civilians. In fact, the title of the 
ESS, “A secure Europe in a better world”, gives a clue in understanding the evolving 
nature of the EU. It aimed to transcend from its traditional borders of dealing solely with 
issues within the Union and place it in an international arena. By acknowledging that the 
Union does not exist in a vacuum, the Council had to deal with the empirical reality of 
the changing nature of world politics by creating a framework within which it could 
operate.  
 
The ESS further proposed possible policies and strategies to help tackle these security 
threats. These included intervening regional conflicts as well as establishing ties with 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the USA to deal with WMD 
proliferation and terrorism respectively. Additionally, the ESS proposed putting an 
initiative to support its neighbouring countries both politically and economically to ensure 
their security. It further proposed establishing an effective mechanism to support 
enforcement of International Law and intervention if neccessary by the UN. This 
proposal, in essence, acknowledged that in a globalized international system, the Union 
had to cooperate with other international institutions if it aimed at playing a role as global 
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security actor. It would tackle its security threats by supporting the international system 
put in place in the form of UN. In a nutshell, one could summarize the objectives of the 
ESS as follows: 
• to tackle the threats; 
• to extend the zone of security around Europe;  
• to strengthen the international order (Quille 2004, 425).  
 
Five years after the ESS was adapted, Javier Solana appeared in the European Council to 
deliver a report on the progress and implementation of the ESS. In terms of peace building 
and humanitarian issues, the CFSP had played some roles. However, the report also 
acknowledged that the threats of WMDs, terrorism, energy security, and climate change 
continued to linger. On the issue of partnerships, the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) had already been established by then and was effectively working to maintain good 
relations and help the development of some neighbouring countries of the EU. Into the 
bargain, the ESS’ proposal for the Union to commit to multilateralism was becoming a 
reality in that the Union advanced closed relations with the UN as well as with other 
actors such as the African Union, OSCE, Canada, Japan, and NATO (General Secretariat 
of the Council 2009).  
 
Empirical evidence, hence, showed that some of the aims advanced by the ESS in 2003 
had been realised five years after its adaptation albeit the report admittedly accepted that 
key areas of threat still existed.  
 
Subsequent in the historical events in the EU’s security pillar transformation was the 
Lisbon Treaty which created the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS 
while functioning as the diplomatic arm of the EU was also given the mandate to work as 
EU’s defence ministry with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy sitting as its head. In 2016, under the leadership of HR/VP Federica Mogherini, an 
EU Global Strategy (EUGS) was formulated. This document which lists “terrorism, 
hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity” reiterates 
Europe’s support towards the multilateralism as an important principle in keeping peace 
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(EUGS 2016). The ESS and the EUGS are similar in this sense as both documents 
“emerge as important sites of managing the EU’s anxiety in the world of quickly 
multiplying ‘unknown unknowns’” (Mälksoo 2016, 376).  
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Table 2.1 Evolution of European Security 
Year Development Treaty / Institutional 
foundation 
1950 NATO North Atlantic Treaty 
1952 Signing of European Defense Community 
treaty 
 
1954 Establishment of Western European Union Brussels treaty 
(amended) 
1958 Establishment of Europan Economic 
Community (ECC) 
Treaty of Rome 
1970 European Political Cooperation  
1987 EPC gains further institutional support 
through SEA 
Single European Act 
1989-90 Fall of Berlin Wall and end of Cold War  
1993 Pillar system is introduced. 
Creation of CFSP 
 
Maastricht Treaty 
1998 Saint Malo declaration  
1999 Creation of CSDP 
Position of High Representation for CFSP is 
established  
Amsterdam treaty 
2003 European Security Strategy by the High Rep  
2009 Abolishment of pillar system Lisbon Treaty 
2011 EEAS is launched 
Establishment of the position of High Rep. 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy / Vice-President of thee 
Commission 
Lisbon treaty 
2016 Adoption of EU Global Strategy   
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY 
 
 
 
When Mark Eyskens, the former Belgian Foreign Minister, stated in 1991 “Europe is an 
economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm” (New York Times 1991), he was 
voicing a criticism to the European Union’s aspirations to act beyond its economic 
actorness at the onset of the Gulf War. To put Eyskens remark in the context of the time, 
the Western world had just emerged from about fifty years of Cold War and the European 
Community depended highly on the North Atlantic Alliance as its major source of 
security while it recovered from the economic drawbacks resulting from the two global 
wars it had suffered in the same century (Vogler and Bretherton, 2006). Hence, by the 
end of the Cold War, the European Community was more of an “economic giant” than 
any other kind of actor. However, almost three decades after this above quoted remark, 
there are still debates and academic discussions in the literature, addressing the question 
of what kind of actor the European Union is in the context of changing global phenomena, 
globalization, technology, nature of war, among many others. This is captured by the 
EU’s Press and Communication’s report in 2004 as follows: 
 
“The EU did not set out to become a world power. Born in the aftermath of 
World War II, its first concern was bringing together the nations and peoples 
of Europe. But as the Union expanded and took on more responsibilities, it 
had to define its relationships with the rest of the world” (European 
Commission 2004, 3). 
 
Undoubtedly, EU’s roles as a global economic actor is empirically uncontested as it 
“remains the largest RTA [Regional Trade Agreement], accounting for 34 per cent of 
world trade” (World Trade Organisation 2018, 74). Additionally, the success of the EU’s 
common market is evident in the fact that intra-trade within the EU accounts for 64% of 
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total trade of the Union (74). Evidently, Eyskens’ description of the Union as an economic 
giant is nothing short of accurate. In recent years however, the debate has moved towards 
the security actorness of the European Union as the EU continues to be involved in several 
operations under the flagship of CSDP/CFSP. 
 
Global security actorness cannot be reduced to a simple affirmative or negative answer. 
Hence, this study examines the extent to which the EU is effective in executing the 
security roles it has assumed through several civilian and military operations. The 
effectiveness of an actor in the global order depends on several factors which are 
discussed in the literature. Among the earliest scholars to study the EU’s global actorness 
is Sjostedt who conceptualised actorness as "the ability [of the European Union] to 
function actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system" 
(1977, 16). Even though Sjostedt’s work does not give adequate criteria to examine the 
global actorness of an actor due to its broad nature, it has served as a starting point upon 
which several further studies have been done, including Bretherton and Vogler (2006).   
 
Various studies have measured the effectiveness of EU actorness from different 
dimensions, which may broadly be classified into two: Internal and External.  In terms of 
external dimension, recognition & presence, authority, and autonomy/opportunity have 
been examined, whereas for internal dimensions, cohesion (and/or shared commitment, 
policy consistency), capability and autonomy have been studied in the literature (Allen 
and Smith 1990; Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Carbone 2008; Zwolski 2012). Autonomy 
falls within both categories since it has both external and internal dimensions as discussed 
below. These categorisations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, the 
EU’s ability to negotiate effectively may also have external dimensions such as the kind 
of international environment it deals with, how the other actors in the environment react, 
and multilateral nature of the policy or negotiation. The table below indicates which 
factors fall under each dimension.  
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Table 3.1 Dimensions of assessing EU actorness 
Internal Dimension External Dimension 
a. Cohesion a. Recognition and Presence 
b. Capabilities        b. Authority 
c. Autonomy  c.) Autonomy and Opportunity 
 
 
This chapter argues that despite the several dimensions and the categorisations above, 
EU’s effectiveness can be best analysed through cohesion, also referred to as coherence 
in the literature. This stems from the argument that once cohesion has been achieved, it 
is easier for the EU to achieve other factors such as capabilities and autonomy. This makes 
the EU a powerful force at the international arena and endows it with the strength to battle 
other challenges in the external dimension. From the internal dimension, a cohesive EU 
is more likely to have the member states providing the capabilities in terms of military 
assets, personnel and finance to the EU to carry out its operations. Additionally, autonomy 
of the EU is likely to follow suit since coherence also implies the non-existence of internal 
challenges to the authority of the EU.  
 
 
3.1 External Dimensions 
 
 
3.1.1 Recognition and Presence 
 
The changing nature of the international environment after the end of the Cold war led to 
new challenges in the EU’s external environment leading to discussions on how the EU 
should react. These constitute the external factors/dimensions shaping the EU’s global 
actor role discussed in this section and the subsequent one. The first criteria of the external 
dimension, recognition and presence, is an intrinsic factor based on how the EU is 
perceived by other actors in international environment after the efforts made by the EU 
to establish presence in global issues. For so long, International Relations discipline had 
22 
 
been (and to some extent still is) dominated by the Realist school of thought that puts 
nation states at the centre of world politics. Championed by Waltz (1959) and 
Mearsheimer (1994), realism had greatly undermined the role of all other actors but states. 
Contrary to realist theory is the argument that “states have not withered away, but they 
are not necessarily the principal, let alone the sole, international actors” (Zielonka 2008, 
472). New actors have emerged in the international system and have been accorded 
recognition both by states and non-state actors transforming global politics into a mixed 
actor system (Young 1972).  
 
Jupille and Caporaso (1998, 214) define recognition as “the acceptance of and interaction 
with the entity by others”. By virtue of the fact that the EU is able to enter bilateral 
agreements with nation states, regional organisations and, and even the UN, it means the 
EU has the “sine qua non of global actorhood” (215). It is essentially recognised by other 
states as a credible actor with whom agreements could be reached. Furthermore, the EU 
strengthens its recognition by asserting its “presence” (Vogler and Bretherton, 2006) 
through extention of its influence in areas such as Africa and Asia which subsequently 
shapes the perceptions of other actors about the role of EU. For instance, the EU motivates 
other regional organisations such African Union and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) to pursue the EU form of integration as the ideal model 
(Söderbaum, StÅlgren and Langenhove 2005, 371). Moreso, Kupchan  (2002, 145) 
argues that EU’s encompassment of both Western and Central and Eastern Europe as well 
as its economic might helps it affirm its identity and presence in global politics.  
 
Another strand of literature has however argued that presence does not emerge from 
activeness of the EU but instead by how the other actors see the EU. Presence in this 
sense means that factors such as reputation matters. The EU’s effectiveness as a security 
actor in this sense depends whether the other actors such as ECOWAS, the UN, and nation 
states deem the EU capable of executing that role. That is to say 
 
“it is not the actor but the presence itself which is the more significant 
phenomenon: in other words, the ways in which a particular notion or set of 
expectations is shaped by the attention of policy makers and institutions can 
itself enter into the realm of political reality and play a consequential role in 
unfolding events. Seen in this way, 'presence' is a feature or a quality of 
arenas, of issue-areas or of networks of activity, and it operates to influence 
the actions and expectations of participants. It can be associated with tangible 
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institutions or groupings, but it can also be expressed in essentially intangible 
ways which are none the less powerful. A particular presence, then, is defined 
by a combination of factors: credentials and legitimacy, the capacity to act 
and mobilize resources, the place it occupies in the perceptions and 
expectations of policy makers” (Allen and Smith 1990, 21).   
 
From this perspective then, the EU’s role as a security actor depends on the the reputation 
it has amassed from its previous involvements in security issues and the perception of 
other actors in the global arena.  
 
 
3.1.2 Authority 
 
Authority as a criteria is underpinned by the international legal framework within which 
the EU operates. The legal competence of the EU to function as a global security actor is 
stipulated by Articles 52 and 53 of the UN Charter. Article 52 of the Charter allows 
“existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to 
the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN Charter), whereas Article 53 
ensures that regional organisations such as the EU would not make enforcements “without 
the authorization of the Security Council” (UN Charter). These two articles in the charter 
have provided legal framework for EU’s civilian and military operations, starting from 
EULEX in Kosovo, and subsequent others in subsahran Africa and Asia (Greiçevci 2011). 
Even though, this legal framework essentially allows the EU to be a global security actor, 
political differences at the UN have in some cases proven to be a standing block. EULEX 
operation in Kosovo exemplifies a situation whereby politics at the UN hindered 
deployment of EU troops. In the Security Council, member states could not reach a 
consensus, while the General Assembly also debated the issue of Kosovan independence 
(Greiçevci 2011, 292). With the fundamental ideological differences between US, UK,  
and France, on one hand and Russia and China on the other, it becomes difficult to 
imagine a UNSC in which these actors reach a consensus to approve of EU’s involvement 
in military missions. Also, since the EU places great importance to multilateralism 
(European Commission 2009), inaction as a result of political differences at the UNSC is 
likely to affect the Union. Hence, it could be argued that the very source of the EU’s 
international legal authority is also the source that cripples, to some extent, EU’s 
functionality in some global security matters as demonstrated by the Kosovan crisis.  
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3.1.3 Autonomy and Opportunity 
 
Autonomy as an external factor can be viewed through EU’s (non)dependence or 
“institutional distinctiveness separate from other involved actors” (Greiçevci 2011, 287). 
The EU asserts its role as a global actor to the extent that it is able to set some global 
agenda and effect some changes on its own.  However, this relationship between the EU 
and the global environment goes both ways in that other actors in the international 
environment present opportunities that shape EU’s global actorness while at the same 
time EU’s contribution presents new opportunities that shape the behaviour of other 
actors (Vogler and Bretherton 2006, 23). For instance, the EU’s role in environmental 
issues since the early 1990s, especially the Kyoto Protocol, indicates how the EU as a 
global actor can set the agenda or even take a leading role in global issues (Vogler 1999; 
Zito 2005; Lightfoot and Burchell 2005). While the EU acts in accordance with the 
opportunities in the global arena, it also plays the function of creating and projecting 
opportunities. This explains the linkage between Vogler and Bretherton’s (2006) 
conceptualisation of opportunity and Jupille and Caporaso’s (2006) conceptualisation of 
autonomy. Put together, these two concepts intertwine to explain the behaviour of actors 
in relation to other actors in the international system.  
 
The rise of China and the extension of its influence to other parts of the world is a factor 
that reduces the opportunities of the EU. China in pursuit of market for its products, 
resources for production, and secure energy source has increased its visibility in global 
issues especially in Africa (Alden 2005; Tull 2006). Moreover, China’s model of 
interaction with the African countries, unlike the EU’s, has no political conditionality 
(Alden 2005) which increases its appeal to the many authoritarian leaders in the world. 
This consequently raises a challenge that the EU has to deal with in terms of opportunities.  
 
 
3.2 Internal Dimensions 
 
 
25 
 
3.2.1 Cohesion 
 
Internal dimension in this study is used as a broader umbrella to capture factors inherent 
to the domestic level issues within the EU, that either attenuate or enhance the 
effectiveness of the EU as a global actor. The first factor to be discussed in here category 
is “cohesion”, referring to coherence of EU foreign policies. Arguably, this has proven to 
be one of the difficult areas around which EU faces difficulties (Nuttall 2005). Two main 
problems are associated with conceptualization and measurement of this concept. First, 
there is not a fine line between coherence and consistency, at least from the perspective 
of member states. Second, some member states tend to associate coherence with EU 
institutions whereas others perceive it in terms of policy makers’ values, rhetorics or even 
processes (Nuttall 2005; Thomas 2012). For the sake of this study, Thomas’ definition of 
coherence is employed: “EU foreign policy coherence is best defined simply as the 
adoption of determinate common policies and the pursuit of those policies by EU Member 
States and institutions.” (2012, 458). This definition however reflects only one form of 
coherence: vertical cohesion. Equally important is the other form known as horizontal 
coherence which refers to consistency between several EU policies and institutions. These 
two forms of cohesion broadly capture the various kinds of cohesion identified in the 
literature.  
 
Similar to Thomas’ (2012) definition, vertical coherence has been defined a consistency 
between the EU level and the national level policies (Carbone 2008, 326). That is, policies 
adopted at the national level shoud ideally correspond if not conflict with the EU level 
policies in order to have efficiency at the EU level. Vertical coherence helps the EU 
achieve its goals since member states would be more willing to participate in EU mission. 
Some researchers have studied how some problems erupting from vertical cohesion can 
be mitigated. “Policy priorities” (Vogler and Bretherton 2006) similar to “tactical 
cohesion” (Jupille and Caporaso 1998, 219) have been discussed as a measure that would 
allow the EU member states to adapt policy goals to fit one another’s by defining priorities 
despite the differences that may exist among themselves. EU member states choose 
common important policy areas as priorities and adopt similar policies towards those 
issues.  
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Horizontal cohesion refers to consistency at within different EU policies as well as 
institutions. Hence, EU policies should not conflict with each other but rather reinforce 
and complement each other. The EU’s plethora of insitutions play important roles in this 
case. The emergence of several bureaucracies, new institutions as well as positions such 
as HR/VR and EEAS, to coordinate EU policy making has undoubtedly improved the 
ability of Union to formulate more coherent policies, a phenomenon reffered to as 
“procedural cohesion” (Jupille and Caporaso 1998, 219). Vogler and Bretherton’s 
theoretical framework overlaps with Jupille and Caporaso’s framework in that they 
encapsulate a similar dynamic though using different terminologies. For instance, shared 
commitment within the EU (Vogler and Bretherton 2006) can be likened with “value 
cohesion… [which] refers to the similarity or compatibility of basic goals” (Jupille and 
Caporaso 1998, 219). The ability of the European Commission to bargain on behalf of all 
the members of the European Union in trade related issues as well as other issues with 
the mandate of the European Council furnishes the Union with greater coherence. In this 
sense, coherence paves way for both autonomy and capabilities, thereby substantiating 
the argument that the EU’s effectiveness can be best measured by looking at coherence 
within the EU. Indeed studies have shown a parallel relationship between coherence  of 
the EU and effectiveness of the CFSP (Luif 2003). Luif while studying the pattern of EU 
member states voting behaviour at the UN General Assembly found a correlation between 
member states voting behaviour and further development of the CFSP (Luif 2003, 54). 
As concluded by Luif (2003), CFSP rests on consensus, that is cohesion, among EU 
member states. The study suggests that in order for the EU to be successful in other 
aspects of its actorness, it need to have cohesion.  
 
Both in the literature and in the EU practices, there is the expectation that “coherence 
leads to an effective, legitimate and credible action, being in turn a sine qua non [for the 
EU] to be recognised as an international actor” (Marangoni and Raube 2014, 486). This 
argument is substantiated by the fact that the EU has dedicated huge amount of money 
and resources towards cohesion. Literature on cohesion places much emphasis on this 
dimension by arguing that in fact “the consequence of incoherence [can be] disastrous for 
the EU” as it cripples the ability of the EU to exert its influence in the global arena (Spence 
2006; Marangoni and Raube 2014, 472). At the EU level, the salience of cohesion was 
manifested by the Lisbon treaty which sort to equip the EU with several instruments to 
cordinate and lead the EU towards coherent policies. In fact, cohesion has been regarded 
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as “miracle solution to strengthen EU actorness” owing to the fact that “a causal 
relationship is usually drawn between coherence and ‘great expectations’, matching EU 
political aspirations for an enhanced international status” (Marangoni and Raube 2014, 
476).  
 
Cohesion has also been shown to emphasise and enhance the legitimacy of EU actorness 
in the world (Portela and Raube 2009). The study by Portela and Raube concluded that 
EU external policies are more effective and legitimate when there is cohesion between 
member states as well as between EU institutions. Since the EU is able to identify speci 
policy areas of importance and define roles for various EU institutions, it is able to come 
up coherent policies that is deemed trustworthy by other actors in the world. This is in 
line with the argument of this thesis that cohesion paves the way for the other dimensions 
and hence provides the best dimension to assess effectiveness of the EU: 
 
Coherence makes the EU’s commitment to comprehensive and global 
objectives credible. The coherence requirement shall ensure that the 
objectives and priorities identified are actually pursued and factored in the 
decision. Coherence triggers a snowball effect: it is an instrument towards, 
first, a more effective and efficient external action of the EU, second, a 
legitimate action and, third, an action across the range of available 
instruments which makes the EU ‘capable of projecting itself, and of being 
perceived as one actor’ (Marangoni and Raube 2014, 478).  
 
 
3.2.2 Autonomy 
 
The internal dimension of autonomy undermines the ability of the EU to act effectively 
as a global actor. Still highly intergovernmental in many but not all aspects, the EU is 
weakened by the national level politics which hinders easy consensus at the regional level. 
This implies that that, while the EU may have the potential to respond effectively at the 
global level, this potential may be killed off unless in cases such as the environmental 
issues where it is easier for member states to coordinate. One way for the EU to overcome 
this hurdle is through “Europeanization”, a process whereby member states adapt EU 
level policies to their national levels (Ladrech 1994). By adapting EU level policies, levels 
of cohesion increase as well thereby increasing the effectiveness of the EU.  In essence, 
member states will ideally think in terms of the Union as a whole and not just of their 
individual countries. National adaptation of EU policies is relatively low due to 
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“…endogenous factors in the member states which affect their capacity to adapt. National 
institutions may clash with, or conform to, European integration; in particular, their 
capacity to accommodate, refract, or resist pressures for change is key to understanding 
the distinctive national and sectoral trajectories of Europeanization” (Wong 2017, 146). 
Having said that, Europeanization is attractive to member states as they acknowledge that 
“a strong European presence in the world is potentially beneficial to all in increasing 
individual member states’s international influence” (Wong 2017, 147). Wong’s 
arguments reflect the argument that EU’s effectiveness at the global level is best achieved 
when member states foreign policies are coherent with each other.  
 
3.2.3 Capabilities 
 
In terms of EU’s capabilities, it is possible to arrive at different conclusions depending 
on the the type of issue at hand. One the one hand, when one looks at the military 
capabilities, or lack of it thereof, of the EU, one can easily conclude that the EU is less 
effective as a global actor in that regard. On the other hand, when one considers other 
tools such as economic power available to the Union, an opposite conclusion may be 
arrived. Despite its institutional framework such as the CSDP and CFSP, the EU 
encounters a crucial problem known in the literature as the “Capability-Expectations 
Gap” (Hill 1993). Hill uses this term to denote how the EU’s expectations are not in sync 
with their capabilities as a results of a lack of political integration; he characterizes the 
EU as an actor with ambitious goals whose capabilities can not match those ambitions. 
(1993, 326).  In a later paper, Hill discusses further that capability of the EU is not 
undermined by lack of assets but rather by the inability of the Union to “translate [the 
assets] into useable power” (1997, 10).  When one looks at other instruments available to 
the EU such as diplomacy, bureaucratic institutions, economy (used as a tool to provide 
incentives or santions), one may regard the EU as actor with sufficient capabilities to 
effect significant changes at the global arena. Several research have explained how the 
EU exercises normative power by using its economic might to reward or punish actions 
of other actors in the international sphere (Manners 2002, Sjursen 2006; Pace 2007; Pace 
2009). 
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All in all, putting the EU in the theoretical framework of global actorness in the literature 
(Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Vogler and Bretherton 2006), it can be argued that the EU 
indeed fits several of the criteria for it to be regarded as an international actor. More 
importantly, cohesion as a dimension reinforces several of the other components, hence 
provides a better framework of assessing the EU’s capacity as a security actor. EU’s 
global actorness is a convergence of several of the above-mentioned components, with 
some strengthening the EU as an actor and others having weakening effects. The central 
argument however is that  cohesions lies at the centre of all these dimensions disussed 
above. Being highly intergovernmental in nature in many policy areas, convergence of 
interest is likely to occur less often as member states prioritise their national politics at 
the expense of the EU level politics. This poses a threat to the EU’s effectiveness to 
negotiate at the global arena. A lack of cohesion at the EU level automatically implies 
that negotiations between the EU and another actor is unlikely to be successful since 
member states would not sign off in the first place. Hence, it is likely to see the EU 
become a successful actor only in the presence of cohesion, that is when member states 
can agree since member states’ approval is de facto a promise of commitment.  
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4 MALI AND THE 2012 CRISIS 
 
 
 
Even though the history of the Malian people can be traced back to the Old Ghana empire 
and the Malian empire, a more relevant history for this study is the colonial and post-
colonial Mali which have shaped the current political and economic dynamics of the 
modern-day Republic of Mali. The current Republic of Mali, formerly known as the 
Sudanese Republic or the French Sudan, created the Mali Federation with Senegal and 
declared independence from French colonial rule which had existed since the late 1800s 
towards the end of the 19th century (The World Factbook 2016). Shortly after declaration 
of independence on 20th June 1960 by the newly formed federation, Senegal left the 
federation leaving the Sudanese Republic which changed its name to the Republic of Mali 
in September 1960.  
 
Crisis following the independence of the Republic of Mali can be examined under the 
lenses of economy and politics. From the political dimension, the country has been 
subject to three military coups, occasional civil tensions and uprisings, and secessionist 
aspirations of the Tuaregs in the North which has become one of the underlying causes 
of the current crisis in which the EU has deployed both civilian and military missions in 
hopes of mitigating the crisis. This chapter provides an overview of Mali, its current 
economic and political situation and how they have contributed to the current crisis.   
 
Before delving in to discuss the political and economic situation and their contribution to 
the uprisings, it is imperative to provide a geographical and demographic overview of the 
country. Mali is a landlocked country bordered by Algeria to its North, Niger to its East, 
Burkina Faso to the South East, Cote D’Ivoire to the South, Guinea to the South West, 
and Senegal and Mauritania to the West. Perhaps, Mali’s relations with its neighbouring 
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countries can be better understood under the lens of shared common threats. Mali is 
located in the Sahel region of Africa which stretches from the West Coast to the Red Sea 
on the East Coast of the continent expanding across several countries: Senegal, 
Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, 
and Eritrea.  
 
 
4.1 Mali’s Relationship with the Broader Sahel Region and its Neighbourhood. 
 
 
The Sahel region which lies between the Sahara in the North and the tropical regions in 
Western Africa has often been a safe haven for several terrorist fighters who flee capture. 
Boko Haram fighters in Northern Nigeria have been known to escape to the Sahel region 
whenever they were faced with a possibility of capture or dismantlement by the Nigeria 
government. Other terrorist groups such as AQIM, Ansaru Dine, and the Movement for 
Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), have also used the Sahel region as hiding 
places and nesting grounds from which they operations could be carried (Alexander 
2015).  
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Fig 4.1 Map of Sahel region, (Source: Danish Institute for International Studies).  
 
 
The use of the Sahel region as a nesting ground for various armed terrorist groups 
automatically creates a threat not only to the home state of the group but also to the whole 
region. Alda and Sala in their study on the Sahel region indicated three main dynamics 
that underline the relationship between the terrorist groups and criminal organizations: 
coexistence, cooperation, and convergence. Coexistence, as the name implies, refers to 
the sharing of a mutual space. Cooperation on the other hand is the decision that “their 
mutual interests are both served, or at not least severely threatened, by temporarily 
working together” (2014, 1). Convergence as a dynamic refers to how the various groups 
begin to mirror each other’s activities. Such threats have been one of the main dynamics 
that has shaped Mali’s relationship not only with the Sahel countries but also with 
ECOWAS countries as a whole.  
 
In the face of the threats of spread of terrorism in the region, Mali together with four other 
countries in the region institutionalised their cooperation in 2014 as the “G5 Sahel” with 
the hopes of coordinating their combat against terrorist threats. The G5 Sahel countries 
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consists of Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mali. The EU “since then… has 
stepped up cooperation with this African-led initiative to build a strong partnership on 
many fronts: from political dialogue, to development and humanitarian support, to 
strengthening security and tackling irregular migration” (EEAS 2019).  
 
 
4.2 Political and Economic Conditions of Mali 
 
 
When Mali embraced democracy in 1991 and subsequently adapted a democratic 
constitution in 1992, it was “considered a role model for francophone Africa” (Martin, 
Martin and Weil 2002, 87). Academic discussions on democracy in Africa regarded 
Malian democracy as one that would be exemplary for the region as a whole (Martin, 
Martin and Weil 2002; Smith 2001). However, current political conditions in the country 
places the country far from the ideal democracy in the region. 2019 freedom house report 
ranks Mali as a partly free country among several other neighbouring countries such as 
Niger, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, Togo, and Guinea. Indeed, among the several 
countries in West Africa, only Ghana, Benin and Senegal are ranked free. With an 
aggregate freedom score of 44 out 100, where 0 is the least free and 100 the freest, Mali 
has failed to fulfil the scholarly expectation of becoming a role model for West African 
democracy.  
 
In the last decade, Mali has experienced the sharpest decline of democracy in Africa and 
the 3rd sharpest in the world, declining from an aggregate score of 72 in 2008 to a score 
of 44 in 2018 (Freedom House 2018). To put this in context, this sharp decline has 
occurred in the aftermath of the 2012 military coup that ousted a democratically elected 
president, Amadou Toumani Toure. This was the third military coup that Mali has 
experienced since independence.  
 
The first coup occurred in 1968, eight years after the establishment of the Mali Republic. 
Mali’s first president, Modibo Keita who was democratically elected and had ruled the 
country after Senegal had split from the Sudan Federation, and was ousted by the military 
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in November 1968 owing to “poor economic performance and dictatorial methods” 
(Moestrup 1999; 176, Bennett 1975). President Keita was replaced by the deputy leader 
of the military, Lieutenant Moussa Traore (Bennett 1975). For the next two decades 
following the coup, Mali would be ruled under a military dictatorial regime of President 
Moussa Traore under a single party system. President Traore’s authoritarianism coupled 
with corruption and financial instability eventually led to a second military coup in post-
colonial Mali in 1991 (Harmon 2016). 
 
The 1991 coup followed a public uprising whereby several people who had gathered on 
the streets to express their dissatisfaction with the regime were countered by President 
Traore’s men leading to the death of at least 59 people and the injury of several hundreds 
(The New York Times 1991). The coup was led by Lieut. Col. Amadou Toumane Toure 
who expressed his desire to install a democratic and multiparty regime in which “the army 
will no longer meddle in politics” (The New York Times 1991). Between 26 March 1991 
when the coup had occurred and 12 April 1992 when general presidential elections were 
held, the military set up a transitional government “headed by a civilian prime minister, 
but in which both military and civilians were represented” (Moestrup 1999, 177). The 
military followed through with their promise and a smooth handing over of presidential 
power to the newly and democratically elected President Alpha Oumar Konare, who ran 
under the ADEMA party of which he was a founding member, ensued in June 1992. This 
coup which was dubbed as the “democratic coup” due to the smooth and easy transfer of 
power to the civilian government by the military, created optimism among academics and 
state actors alike (Nathan 2013, 467). Consequently, alarming issues such as “low voter 
turn-out, student unrest, and, especially, ethnic tensions, sometimes violent, in the 
country’s Saharan and Sahelian reaches” were ignored (Harmon 2016, 71).  
 
Issues such as the marginalization of minority groups and economic inequalities in the 
early few years after President Oumar Konare had come to power were some of the 
problems that were ignored while scholars praised Mali’s democratic transition. As 
Harmon discussed, “observers saw what they wanted to see, an island of political reform, 
religious tolerance, and economic growth on a continent that otherwise featured failed 
states, authoritarian governments, poverty, and outbursts of genocide” (Harmon 2016, 
35 
 
71).  By 2012, the intensification of marginalisation and internal uprisings indicated that 
Mali was neither an island of political reform and tolerance, nor was it a country with an 
exemplary economic development in its region.  
 
Mali is currently classified as one of the Least Developed Countries, as defined by UN 
General Assembly resolutions 2626 (XXV) and 2768 (XXVI). The list of LDC is checked 
every three years by the Committee for Development Policy under the mandates of two 
UN institutions, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 
Countries are assessed every three years based on three criteria, namely income, human 
assets, and economic vulnerability, to determine whether they can graduate from LDC 
status (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2019). Mali entered 
the list in 1971 among the first list of countries and has not graduated since then. While a 
number of countries have either graduated or have set target years for graduation, 
prospects of such development for Mali remains unlikely (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs 2019). 
 
Table 4.1 Mali’s Gross National Income 2018 
 
 
From table 4.1 above, it can be seen that with a per capita national income of 801 USD, 
Mali lies significantly below the 1229 USD average of all LDCs. To graduate from LDC 
to the status of a developing country, Mali needs to have a per capita GNI of at least 1230 
USD. A similar trend is observed in Mali’s Human Asset Index (HAI) captured by the 
table below.  
 
Table 4.2: Human asset index, Mali.  
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Table 4.2 represents the HAI which captures issues such as infant mortality, 
undernourished population, literacy rate, and mortality rate. In essence, it looks at the 
vital factors that may lead to structural violence. The index is on a scale of 0 to 100 where 
100 reflects the highest level of human development. Similar to the GNI, Mali, with a 
43.1, falls below the LDC average of 53.1. The third component capturing the 
development of Mali is reflected by the Economic Vulnerability index (HVI) which 
reflects the extent to which Mali’s economy is stable.  
Table 4.3 Economic vulnerability index, Mali. 
 
 
Table 4.3 above indicates how stable the country’s economy is by looking at factors such 
as the state of export, stability of agricultural production, and the share of agriculture and 
fishing in the country’s GDP. In this case, Mali’s performance appears to be better than 
the average of the LDCs. A higher score indicates high vulnerability and the vice versa 
reflects a low vulnerability. Mali score in this index is a 36.8 whereas all LDCs average 
41.3. Nevertheless, Mali needs a score below 32 to graduate from the LDC category.  
 
It is within this economic and political context that a third military which ousted a 
democratically elected president occurred in 2012. As discussed below, the events leading 
to the crisis in 2012 have roots both in the political and economic conditions of the 
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country, hence the need for the discussions above. The next sections discuss the crisis and 
the third coup and the subsequent involvement of the EU in the crisis.  
 
 
4.3 Background of the 2012 Crisis 
 
 
In 2012, a rebellion led by the Tuaregs and remnants of AQIM from the Libyan crisis 
threatened the peace and sovereignty of the Malian government.  The Tuareg tribe, a 
nomadic group who mostly reside in Northern Mali and Niger have always been known 
for their desire to secede from the Malian state. Since independence, the Tuaregs have 
constantly expressed their desire to secede from the Mali Republic. This resistance by the 
Tuareg traces back to the French colonisation period but did not deliver any results as the 
French colonialist possessed greater power with which they coerced the Tuaregs into 
staying in the French Sudanese Republic, the predecessor state of Mali. In the aftermath 
of Mali’s independence from France, Tuaregs became part of the newly independent state, 
albeit unwillingly (Benjaminsen 2008).  
 
Even though Tuaregs and the Malian state have had several disputes since Malian 
independence, three main waves of rebellion stand out in the country’s civil conflict 
history. The “first Tuareg rebellion” occurred in 1963, three years after independence. 
The then newly formed Malian government responded harshly by using coercive and 
military means to suppress the rebellion (Keita 1998, 102). Marginalisation by the new 
Malian government by labelling them “unproductive” and “the useless Malian” (le Mali 
inutile) further fed into the rivalry between the group and the Malian administration 
(Benjaminsen 2008, 828). Essentially, the policies by the Malian government drew a 
further wedge between Tuaregs and the rest of the Malians further enforcing the 
sentimentality and feeling of not being Malians (Poulton and Youssouf 1998). Thus, post-
colonial Mali from the onset set the stage for marginalisation of the Tuareg people as 
President Modibo Keita, Mali’s first president, saw the Tuareg’s nomadic way of life as 
an obstacle to modernization and development (Benjaminsen 2008, 828).  
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The “second Tuareg rebellion” occurred between 1991 and 1996 following an 
environmental crisis in the 1980s which led to famine and resource scarcity. The Sahel 
region has an unstable climate with occasional heavy rainfall that renders the land 
infertile. Northern Mali, homeland to the Tuaregs, has been struck “by drought several 
times during the 20th century, most importantly in 1903, 1913–14, 1930–32, 1944–48, 
1972–75 and 1982–87” (Benjaminsen 2008, 827). The second rebellion was a product of 
the 1982-87 drought which wreaked hunger and poverty in the region. Accordingly, the 
rebellion has been referred to as an environmental conflict (Benjaminsen 2008). The 
resulting conflict led to the death of thousands and displacement of about 250,000 people 
in the North (Baechler 1999; Kahl 2006; Lecocq 2004 90). The secessionist aspirations 
of the Tuareg group became stronger and more apparent as they felt like the Malian 
government exploited them while they reaped no benefits from the national pie. The 
rebellion has been partly attributed to the Tuareg people reacting to the “embezzlement 
by government officials of international relief aid destined for the drought-stricken 
people” (Benjaminsen 2008, 829).  
 
The intervention and mediation by the UNDP, France, Norway, and Mauritania in the 
country helped open channels for dialogues which eventually tamed the conflict. A peace 
agreement was reached under the newly elected President Alpha Oumar Konare in 1992 
(Lecocq and Klute, 2013). The dialogues incorporated civil societies to facilitate 
intercommunal dialogues to ensure that efforts to deal with the issue would not be 
confined only to the highest level but also cover the grassroots (Benjaminsen 2008, 831).  
 
The third rebellion started with a demand for autonomy by the National Movement of 
Azawad (MNA) in 2010 which was ignored by President Amadou Toumane Toure. 
President Toure, one of the military leaders of the coup in 1991, ran for President in 2002 
and got elected. The third Tuareg rebellion occurred during his second term in office. 
Even though the demands of the MNA were ignored by Toure’s administration, there 
were no immediate reactions from the group. Parallel to these events, Libya was also 
going through a revolution. President Gaddafi recruited Tuareg fighters to assist his men 
to combat the revolutionaries. By so doing, the Tuaregs put their secessionist demands in 
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Mali on hold until the war in Libya was over (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 430). The Tuareg 
mercenaries returned home and joined the MNA which was later transformed to MNLA. 
Some members of AQIM also joined forces with the MNLA to help the latter achieve 
their secessionist goals.  
 
The newly formed MNLA, heavily armed with weapons obtained from Libya, began a 
campaign to cease cities in the North and declare them independent. In January 2012, 
MNLA’s campaign began “in northern Mali and within 10 weeks had conquered all towns 
and villages in the north, completely defeating the Malian army. On 6 April, the 
movement declared the independence of northern Mali, announcing the creation of a new 
state called Azawad” (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 410).  
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Figure 4.2 Northern Mali Conflict Map (Source: The Guardian, 2013) 
 
 
The blue region in the map indicates the parts of the country captured by the MNLA. In 
addition to being heavily armed, the group had the support of MUJWA, an Islamist and 
splinter group of AQIM (Lecocq and Klute 2013). However, this collaboration was short-
lived as the secessionist former and the Islamist latter could not agree on how to rule the 
north.  
 
A military coup in March 2012 which ousted the democratically elected President Touré 
created further chaos in the country. President Touré was criticised for “being ambivalent, 
too soft, and professionally incompetent and therefore responsible for the repeated defeats 
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of the Malian army” (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 430). This military coup, third in Mali’s 
post-independence history, came a few months before elections were scheduled to be 
held. MOJWA aimed to exploit the chaos in the government by embarking on an 
independent armed attack towards Bamako, the capital town, to capture more territories. 
As they neared the capital, fear arose, and the Malian administration solicited France’s 
help to deal with the crisis. France’s involvement ignited a rapid reaction from the EU 
which quickly condemned the MNLA’s declaration of independence and subsequently 
adopted a resolution to embark on a training mission to train the Malian army to fight off 
the insurgents.  
 
From these perspectives, one could easily see how dire the situation was for the EU. The 
ousting of a democratically elected president a month before elections only to be replaced 
by a militarily appointed leader, alongside the involvement of ex AQIM fighters who had 
been active in the Libya crisis of 2011 and now aiming to spread Islamist ideas were in 
sharp contrast with both the EU’s normative, economic and security interests. On the one 
hand, ousting a democratically elected leader had the potential to disrupt the stability in 
the region should other states follow suit and react similarly. On the other hand, the EU’s 
economic interest would better be preserved if they had to deal with a legitimate 
government rather than one controlled by the military. Last but equally important was the 
fact that an independent Sahel region could become a breeding place for various terrorist 
cells such as Boko Haram, AQIM, and al-Shabaab who could easily target the EU using 
the region as their base of operation. This context warranted EU member states’ swift 
reaction towards the issue, starting with France.  
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5 EU-MALI RELATIONSHIP AND THE 2012 CRISIS 
 
 
 
Since independence, Mali’s relationship with the EU has mostly been characterised by 
economic inequality, with the former being highly underdeveloped economically and 
benefitting from aids and preferential trade treatment by the EU. Until the 2000s, EU’s 
relationship with Mali and the region as a whole remained under an economic framework 
whereby the EU provided a non-reciprocated treatment to Mali and other ACP (Africa, 
Caribbean, and Pacific) countries as a whole. The extension of this relation to cover 
political and security-related issues have been realized only in the aftermath of the Cold 
War and the establishment of the CFSP and CSDP. Under the CFSP, the EU was able to 
deploy its resources to areas where humanitarian crises proved to be a threat.  
 
Historically, EU’s relationship with Mali was first institutionalised by the Lomé 
Convention which saw subsequent renewals within approximately 5 years intervals. This 
agreement which also extended to several less developed countries, allowed Mali to 
export some products to the EU without artificial trade barriers. This dynamic has been 
applauded by some who have characterised the relationship as positive discrimination 
(Gibb 2000, 457). Zartman argued that this was indeed “a natural step in the process of 
decolonization, that at the same time strengthens the capabilities of the developing 
African economies and polities while diluting their bilateral ties with the metropole” 
(Zartman 1976, 342). In 2002, the Cotonou agreement was signed albeit with a condition 
of reciprocity. This meant that Mali would also open its borders to EU products without 
artificial barriers to trade. Despite this condition of reciprocity, the EU’s commitment is 
evidenced by the allocation of a total 2 Billion EUR by the EU to Mali between 2014 and 
2018 towards the aim of development cooperation (EEAS 2019).  
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Some scholars pointed out the limitation of the EU’s economic aid by arguing that the 
EU’s aid fell short in that the EU had neglected current and dire global issues such as 
“climate change, food insecurity, financial instability, communicable diseases, migration, 
conflict and insecurity” (Koch 2015, 4). However, in the face of the Malian crisis in 2013, 
which is the case study for this thesis, the EU’s role went beyond economic actorness to 
include the role of a security actor. The crisis to which the EU deployed a training mission 
involved security threats such as migration and instability, as envisioned by Koch (2015).  
 
The 2012 crisis led to further development of the EU’s role in Mali and the Sahel region 
as a whole, in that the EU went beyond an economic actor as a security provider and 
facilitator in the region. As discussed earlier, the EU has been highly supportive of the 
G5 Sahel initiative. The EU’s goal of strengthening security and development in the 
region is manifested by its allocation of around 4 billion EUR over the periods between 
2014-2020 through the European Development Fund and the EU Trust Fund (European 
Commission 2018). Moreover, “the EU is a member of the Sahel Alliance, launched and 
signed by the EU, France and Germany in July 2017” with the aim of facilitating 
development and security in the region (EEAS 2019). In 2018, the Sahel Alliance, 
currently consisting of 12 members: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Denmark, EU, UNDP, the African Development Bank (AfDB) 
and the World Bank, “signed a partnership protocol [with G5 Sahel], which establishes 
the framework of the cooperation” between the two sides. Hence, EU’s role in 
postcolonial Mali has transformed from development cooperation to include a security 
and political dimension, a phenomenon which has come to be known as development-
security nexus.  
 
 
5.1 EU in the Crisis 
 
 
The presence of EU in global security has increased significantly since the establishment 
of the CFSP. The EU has embarked on several security operations some of which it 
overtook from NATO and some which they have initiated themselves. The EU-led 
military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in March 
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2003 pioneered EU military missions and the Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
initiated the same year marked the onset of EU-led civilian missions. The extension of 
EU operations beyond the close neighbourhood of Europe is evidence that the EU is 
following through with its goal of asserting roles shaping it as a global security actor. The 
HR/VR, Frederica Mogherini, in her 2016 foreword to the EU global strategy expressed 
this sentiment clearly when she wrote that “we [the EU] need to collectively take 
responsibility for our role in the world. And wherever I travel, our partners expect the 
European Union to play a major role, including as a global security provider” (EEAS 
2016, 3). Further in the same foreword, she expresses that 
  
“the idea that Europe is an exclusively “civilian power” does not do justice to 
an evolving reality. For instance, the European Union currently deploys 
seventeen military and civilian operations, with thousands of men and women 
serving under the European flag for peace and security – our own security, 
and our partners.’ For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand” (EEAS 
2016, 4). 
 
Mogherini’s words embody the desire of the EU to be recognised globally as an important 
actor not just in trade but also in security related issues. Unsurprisingly, in less than two 
decades since the EU launched its very first military operation, the total number of 
missions embarked by the Union has increased to thirty-five of which seventeen is ended. 
 
Of the thirty-five CSDP/CFSP operations undertaken by the EU, twenty of them have 
been (or are being) carried out in Africa which essentially demonstrates the extent to 
which the region is seen as a threat to EU security. While several literatures have studied 
the success of the EU in its immediate neighbourhood, relatively little has been done 
exploring the effectiveness of these operations in Sub-Saharan Africa.  This chapter 
explores EU’s involvement as a security actor in the Mali and the broader Sahel region. 
Employing the theoretical framework in chapter 3 which defined the criteria of a security 
actor, this chapter subsequently analyses the effectiveness of the EU in the EUTM Sahel 
Mali operation.  
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5.1.1 EUTM SAHEL MALI 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa though not in the immediate neighbourhood has been envisioned as 
a potential origin of threat to European security. These threats ranging from immigration 
to terrorism have motivated the EU to involve itself arguably more than other security 
actors in the region. For many years, the US’s policy (“the fight against terrorism”) has 
mostly been confined to the Middle East and North Africa. The regional organisations 
such the African Union and ECOWAS who may have aspirations of involving themselves 
more in the security of the region are crippled by the lack of resources compared to 
Europe. Other than the obvious evidence that the EU spends more militarily and possesses 
more capabilities than the regional actors, the EU is also motivated by the desire to keep 
influence over their former colonies (Mayall 2005; Olsen 2015). Certainly, EU’s 
operation in Mali has been preceded by several other operations in Africa as indicated in 
the table below.  
 
Table 5.1 EU operations in Africa 
Operation/mission Target Country Type of 
mission 
Beginning 
year 
Ended/Ongoing 
EU- NAVFOR 
Somalia 
Mauritania; Seychelles; 
Somalia 
Military 2008 Ongoing 
EUSEC RD Congo Democratic republic of 
Congo 
Civilian 2005 ended 
EUCAP Sahel Mali Mali Civilian 2014 Ongoing 
EUPOL RD CONGO Democratic republic of 
Congo 
Civilian 2007 ended 
EUFOR RD CONGO Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Military 2006 ended 
EUCAP Niger Niger Civilian 2012 Ongoing 
EUTM RCA Central Africa Republic Military 2016 Ongoing 
EUPOL Kinshasa Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Civilian 2005 ended 
EUTM Mali Mali Military 2013 Ongoing 
ARTEMIS, (DRC) Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Military 2003 Ended 
46 
 
 
AMIS (Darfur) Sudan Civilian and 
Military 
2005 Ended 
EUFOR TCHAD - 
RCA 
Central African 
Republic; Chad 
Military 2008 Ended 
EUFOR RCA Bangui Central African Republic Military 2014 Ended 
EUTM Somalia Somalia Military 2010 Ongoing 
EUCAP Nestor, 
EUCAP Somalia 
Horn of Africa Civilian 2012 ongoing 
EU-SSR Guinea Bissau Civilian 2008 Ended  
EUAVSEC South 
Sudan 
South Sudan Civilian 2012 Ended 
EUMAM RCA 
 
Central African Republic Military 2015 Ended 
 
In recent years, the Sahel region stretching from the west coast of Africa (Senegal and 
Mauritania) to Sudan and Eritrea has become a crucial region as far as European security 
is concerned. The biggest security concern erupting from the region is the rise of 
terrorism. The region is home or at least has at some point harboured some radical Islamist 
groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram. In 2012, the 
brink of an armed conflict between the Malian government on one hand and on the other 
hand two extremist groups, AQIM and National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
(NMLA) eventually led to the EUTM Sahel Mali operation. 
 
EU’s involvement in the conflict came in the form of an emergency Foreign Affairs 
Council meeting (FAC) soon after the French had embarked on operation Serval. For the 
EU, several factors at stake drove their decision to volunteer as security providers in the 
Sahel region. EU in its strategy document about relations with Africa has pointed out that  
 
“In pursuing these [political stability, security, good governance, and social 
cohesion] objectives, the EU will need to promote and encourage actively 
African responsibility and ownership, particularly of the African Union (AU) 
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to 
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demonstrate focus, urgency, pragmatism and political engagement, along 
with flexibility and a requirement to coordinate with other players, such as 
the Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), as well as other 
bilateral and multilateral partners with an interest in the region, including the 
UN, the USA, Canada and Japan and the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya 
and Morocco)” (EEAS 2011, 4). 
 
Evidently, the EU advocates for African states to take more responsibility of themselves 
while it plays a supporting role. The opposite is however observed in the Malian case. 
The European partners played the more dominant role while the ECOWAS and AU were 
mostly in the shadows of the EU. This presents some empirical puzzles: If the EU 
advocates for increased African ownership, why did it take on more responsibilities in the 
conflict than the African states? Secondly, why were the African coalition willing (or 
perhaps desperate) for a European support?  
 
The actions of both sides were greatly driven by fear. EU’s fear originated from the 
prospects of losing the economic benefits it reaps from the region in the form of Uranium 
and gas, which meant that stability in the region is highly in the interest of the EU. A 
second fear factor common to both the African regional organisation and their European 
counterpart is the possibility of spill-over. Other governments in the region readily 
welcomed the France and the EU because they could not afford to risk losing the war 
against the growing AQIM which has a record of partnering with other terrorist groups in 
the region such as Boko Haram. Having the European actors provided a higher probability 
of winning the war. For Europe, terrorism anywhere is an existential threat to the EU. 
Strengthening of terrorism in a region close to Algeria, Morocco and Libya meant that 
these terrorists could easily find their way to Europe through the Maghreb. These factors 
accordingly shaped the EU’s willingness to take more responsibility despite its previous 
pledge of African ownership and responsibility.  
 
 
5.1.2 The EU and Establishment of EUTM MALI 
 
Since the onset of the crisis, the contribution of the EU as a united front has always been 
in accordance with EU’s policy of African ownership. In this regard, the Council decision 
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that established EUTM Mali on 17 January 2013 emphasised that the EU would not pick 
up arms against the insurgents. Instead the contribution of the Union would be in two 
forms: to assist in training the Malian military and to help economic development in Mali 
through financial aid. As stipulated by the mission statement:  
 
“The Union shall conduct a military training mission (EUTM Mali), to 
provide, in the South of Mali, military and training advice to the Malian 
Armed Forces (MAF) operating under the control of legitimate civilian 
authorities, in order to contribute to the restoration of their military capacity 
with a view to enabling them to conduct military operations aiming at 
restoring Malian territorial integrity and reducing the threat posed by terrorist 
groups. EUTM Mali shall not be involved in combat operations” (Council 
Decision 2013/34/CFSP 2013). 
 
In addition to equipping and preparing the MAF to battle the armed insurgents, the 
Council also indicated that it would coordinate and work alongside the UN and ECOWAS 
throughout the crisis management process. Evidently, not only was the EU acting in 
accordance with its culture of preferring a multilateral approach, but it also acted in 
consistency with its notion of African ownership. The mandate of this operation initially 
set to last a period of 15 months had a financial backing of 12.3 million Euros to smoothen 
the operation. About a month before the expiration of the 15-month mandate, the Council 
renewed it for further extensions. Now in the fourth mandate, the roles and scope of the 
EUTM Sahel operation have been broadened to cover not only Mali but also other parts 
of the region.  
 
 
5.1.3 EUTM Mandates and Scopes 
 
The mandate of the EUTM Mali has undergone several renewals with the current one 
being the fourth. The first mandate which established the mission in February 2013 was 
set to last a period of 15 months financed by a budget of a little more than 12 million 
Euros. A month before the expiration of the first mandate, the Council passed a second 
resolution that extended the mission for a second mandate that will last until May 2016. 
A third mandate came forth with further extending the mandate for 2 more years, May 
2016 to May 2018, with an increased budget of over 33 million Euros. The fourth and 
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current mandate which was approved in May 2018 extended the mission to 2020 as well 
as an allocation of a budget of almost 60 million Euros.  
 
These mission objectives of these four mandates can be understood by grouping them 
according to the scope of the respective missions. The first two mandates were restricted 
to providing military training and advice in Southern Mali.  The first two mandates that 
spanned from 2013 to 2016 were both limited to Southern Mali. The mission goals were 
confined to providing military trainings to the Malian armed forces. In the latter two 
missions, the mandate allowed further training missions in other parts of the country, 
specifically the northern region encompassing Niger River area, Gao and Timbuktu. The 
mission report of the current mandate shows an increasing number of Malian soldiers 
trained. The first mandate which started with the training of about 650 Malian soldiers 
now has around 13,000 trained MAF over the span of about 6 years (EEAS 2019). 
Nevertheless, all these mandates are underpinned by a common policy: executive 
operation. Being an executive mission implies that EU staff members deployed to the 
mission have no right to engage in any combats. The mandate only allows personnel to 
train and provide assistance and advice to MAF for the designated time scope. 
Approximately a year more until this mandate ends (in 2020), it is perhaps early for the 
Council to discuss the possibility of an extension of the operation. However, evidence 
from a Brussels (discussed in the next section below) meeting which approved a joint 
civilian-military operation and allocation of 67 million Euros thereof on January 18th 
suggests that EUTM Mali will most likely have an extension. 
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Table 5.2 EUTM Mali mandates 
EUTM Mali mandates 
 
 
Mandate 
 
Council 
approval 
date 
 
 
Start-End 
 
  
Mandate and 
objectives 
 
 
Budget 
Participating 
countries 
and staff 
1st 
mandate 
 
17.01.2013 
 
18.02.2013-
18.05.2014 
• Military training 
mission in Southern 
Mali, Bamako. 
• Train 650 Malian 
soldiers 
EUR 
12.3 
million  
23 EU 
countries; 
550 staff 
2nd 
mandate 
15.04.2014 19.05.2014- 
18.05.2016 
• Same objectives as 
the 1st mandate 
• Providing military 
expertise and advise 
EUR 
27.7 
million 
28 countries 
(23 EU, 5 
non-EU); 580 
stuff 
3rd 
mandate 
23.03.2016 19.05.2016-
18.05.2018 
• Train advice and 
educate MAAF 
• Extension of 
mission to include 
Niger River, and 
northern cities 
including Gao and 
Timbuktu 
• Enable the MaAF to 
increasingly take 
responsibility for a 
military owned 
education and 
training system.  
EUR 
33.4 
million 
27 countries 
(23 EU, 4 
non-EU); 506 
personnel 
4th 
mandate 
14.05.2018 18.05.2018-
18.05.2020 
• In addition to the 
objectives of the 3rd 
mandate, provide 
support to G5 
Sahel.** 
EUR 
59.7 
million 
27 countries 
(22 EU, 5 
non-EU); 620 
personnel 
Note: Dates are in dd.mm.yyyy format 
**G5 Sahel is a security framework established by Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, 
Mauritania, and Mali in the Sahel region to coordinate policies towards keeping stability 
in the region.  
 
 
5.1.4 The Joint Civil-Military Operation/ The Security-development Nexus.  
 
At a Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) council meeting on 18th February 2019, the Council 
“approved a joint civil-military concept of operations on regionalisation of CSDP action 
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in the Sahel” (Council of the European Union 2019, 10). The Council further allocated 
an amount of 67 million Euros to the civilian mission in Mali. While this was the first 
time the Council institutionally pronounced the civilian and the military mission as joint 
and complementary, the two operations have practically been a de facto joint operation. 
 
The civilian mission EUCAP Mali was established in April 2014, a little over a year after 
the military training mission was inaugurated. The mission was to ensure that other 
aspects of crisis in Mali such as human right issues, competence police force, and poverty 
that are closely linked with democracy and development would complement the training 
mission that had already started a year before. The EU in its actions reflects an emphatic 
notion that security and development are correlative with effective institutions and good 
governance. A wide range of literature has in fact investigated this notion which grown 
to referred to as “security-development nexus” (Stern and Öjendal 2010; Gänzle 2012; 
Smith 2013; Furness and Gänzle 2017). Ergo, EU as a security actor in Africa has worked 
accordingly by not ignoring the civilian aspects of security.  
 
More notably is the fact that the EU recognised the possible security threat in the Sahel 
region earlier before the crisis by adapting the Strategy for Security and Development in 
the Sahel, also dubbed the Sahel Strategy. The “Sahel Strategy” first and foremost 
stipulated that “security and development in the Sahel cannot be separated, and that 
helping these countries achieve security is integral to enabling their economies to grow 
and poverty to be reduced” (EEAS 2011, 1). This commitment to addressing security 
issues hand in hand with economic and development issues is reflected by the amount of 
economic aid provided by the EU to the Sahel region as well as the EUCAP Mali mission 
that followed in 2014. 
 
The EU adapted a separated programmed funding for the G5 countries with Mali 
receiving an amount of 202 million Euros out of 263.15 million for ongoing programmes 
for the Sahel countries (EEAS 2011, 9). By 2013, the total amount of funding allocated 
to the Mali, Niger, and Mauritania had exceed 1.5 billion Euros (EEAS 2016b). 
Additionally, the European Commission raised an amount of about 520 million euros for 
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Mali at an international conference for donations in Belgium in 2013. From an 
institutional perspective, the role of the civilian mission also includes aiding the local 
Malian police and other security forces to maintain democratic stability and enforcement 
of constitution to maintain peace. Evidently, the EU has employed a comprehensive 
approach to dealing with the crisis by including the national level perspective as well as 
the domestic level.  
 
5.2 France and Operation Serval 
 
 
On January 11 2013, French President Francois Hollande ordered a military attack against 
the AQIM insurgents who were getting closer to Bamako, the capital. The French reaction 
was in response to a request by Malia President Dioncounda Traore less than 24 hours 
before the attack. An imminent armed combat between the Malian military and the 
Islamist groups had prompted President Traore to solicit help from France (International 
Crisis Group 2013; Heisbourg 2013). To the surprise of Islamist insurgents who least 
expected France to mobilise in less than 24 hours, President Hollande ordered the French 
military to embark on Operation Serval in Mali under the legal framework of UN Article 
51 which allows a collective self-defence until the UN has taken measures. The Islamist 
group least expecting the swift reaction found themselves to the disadvantage of fighting 
an army much stronger in weapons and tactic.  The French administration went all out by 
“deploying fighter planes, helicopters and hundreds of soldiers from military bases in the 
region or directly from French territory” (International Crisis Group 2013, 7). 
Unsurprisingly, the French army had an easy win against the militants and further went 
up north to reclaim Azawad and all other territories that had fallen to the insurgent group.  
 
Operation Serval in its first week conformed with the declared French aim of helping 
restore captured lands and maintaining the integrity and sovereignty of the Malian 
government. Indeed in the early stage of the operation, the French President announced 
that the “war aims were to secure Bamako, stop the terrorist offensive, strike the enemy’s 
rear bases and prepare for the arrival of African forces – ECOWAS having announced its 
decision to send forces to Mali, which began arriving from 19 January onwards” 
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(Heisbourg 2013, 11). Upon the defeat of the terrorist offensive however, these aims had 
evolved into a French agenda of fighting against terrorism. For the French administration, 
the crisis in Mali was a subset of the global terrorist network especially considering the 
recent Libyan crisis that had just ended. Accordingly, the aim of the Operation Serval 
transformed to incorporate the fight against terrorism in the Sahel region, or as referred 
to in the literature a “Sahelistan” (Heisbourg 2013).  
 
Despite France’s significant involvement, it advocated vehemently for a multilateral 
approach to dealing with the conflict which paid off in the form of the EU launching a 
training mission in the region, UN passing a number of resolutions and the regional actors 
—AU and ECOWAS— contributing militarily and diplomatically to mitigating the crisis. 
 
 
5.3 ECOWAS 
 
 
From the perspective of the several actors involved, ECOWAS was perceived as the ideal 
actor to deal with the crisis. In all UN resolutions concerning the crisis, ECOWAS was 
the first actor to be specifically referenced by the Security Council to form an armed front 
in support of the Mali. From the European Union’s perspective, African ownership has 
always been at the heart of its recent relations with African states. Hence, even when the 
EU launched EUTM in Mali, the purpose was to train Malian military to equip them with 
skills and tactics of combating such insurgencies. And from the French perspective, 
Operation Serval was a temporary mission that would hold off the insurgents until the 
regional organisation had organised and mobilised to counter them. ECOWAS therefore 
was an actor that everyone looked up to with some expectations, but it could not deliver 
the expectations of the actors.   
 
Some studies have argued that the dominance of France in the crisis highlighted not only 
the limitations of ECOWAS but also that of the international system as a whole. 
ECOWAS though relatively incapacitated by its lack of resources has always been an 
eager and willing actor since the onset of the crisis. Using diplomatic, political and 
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economic capabilities, ECOWAS made attempts at peace processes and conflict 
resolutions. First, it categorically refused to recognise the independence of the Azawad 
region in an emergency meeting on March 27 2012. Secondly, it condemned the military 
takeover in 2013 and imposed economic sanctions of the military government to coerce 
the military to restore a civilian one. Neighbouring countries shut their borders to Mali, 
simultaneously the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) froze Mali’s accounts 
leaving the military junta with little choice. Thirdly, it established a diplomatic 
communication that saw President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso mediate peace 
processes between the Malian government and the secessionist MNLA (International 
Crisis Group 2012). 
The efforts by the regional actors (ECOWAS and AU) paid off in April 2012 when the 
military handed over the government to Dioncounda Traore, then leader of the Malian 
National assembly, who served as the interim head of state for a year and half. Despite 
these efforts by the ECOWAS, it is widely argued that ECOWAS as a security actor in 
the crisis delivered below par, a factor that caused the dominance of the French and 
subsequently the EU (Olsen 2014). The AFISMA mandated by the UNSC could not be 
mobilised in time which contributed to the French’s and subsequently EU’s dominance. 
Secondly, when AFISMA could mobilise to provide military support, it lacked the 
logistical and intelligence capabilities to operate therefore relying on the French for these 
capabilities (Olsen 2014, 290). These limitations have led to some studies concluding that 
the regional organisation’s role in management of the crisis was relatively less impactful 
than the European counterparts (Wing 2016). Even though ECOWAS seemed like an 
impactful actor at the beginning of the crisis when it resorted to diplomatic means in the 
aftermath of the coup, “the credibility of its diplomatic action was seriously compromised by a 
lack of transparency in the attempts at the mediation” (International Crisis Group 2012, i).   
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6 ASSESSING EU’S ACTORNESS IN MALI: STRENGTHS AND 
WEAKNESSES 
 
 
 
This chapter employs the theoretical framework discussed in chapter three to analyse the 
effectiveness of the security actorness of the EU. In line with the criteria discussed in 
chapter three, EU’s effectiveness as a security actor shall be assessed through cohesion. 
As established in chapter 3, despite the several dimensions through which the EU’s role 
could be assessed, cohesion provides the most appropriate analytical framework since it 
incorporates and directly affects other dimensions such as autonomy and capabilities. 
Other dimensions of effective actorness such as autonomy and capabilities of the EU are 
tied to cohesion in the sense that a cohesive and consistent EU would be able to amass 
capabilities from member states easily. Moreover, cohesion between several EU 
institutions and policies facilitates the realisation of EU goals. 
 
 
6.1 Cohesion 
 
 
Policy coherence have several dimensions discussed in the literature including inter-level 
coherence, inter-institutional coherence, and intra-level coherence (Christiansen 2001). 
However, for the reasons outlined in Chapter three, this study focuses on vertical and 
horizontal coherence.  
 
 
6.1.1 Vertical Cohesion 
 
Vertical coherence depicts policy consistency between the EU level and the member 
states level (Carbone 2008, 326). That is to say, “a high level of vertical consistency 
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entails that member States comply with the policies agreed upon at the EU level” 
(Zwolski 2012, 74). This is particularly hard to deal with since the EU consists of 28 
member-states whose national priorities may complicate the EU’s role as a security actor. 
At this level, the question then is that, to what extent were the EU member states policies 
coordinated with the EU’s security policies in Mali?  
 
Answering this question requires looking at the actions of the various member states and 
their willingness to participate in the operation. The proposition here is that, a lack of 
coherence between the EU level policy and the national level policy should result in few 
member states contributing to the operation, whereas a high level of coherence should 
improve the EU’s effectiveness as a security actor. At the time of its first deployment in 
2013, the EUTM Mali consisted of 23 out of 28 EU member states with a shared financial 
cost of EUR 12.3 million. Among the highest contributors were France, Germany, UK, 
and Czech Republic which reflects the level of vertical consistency in the mission. The 
participation of a high number of member states including the most powerful ones 
indicates that the mission had a high level of vertical consistency. In addition to the EU 
mandate, the parallel operation carried out by France serve to reinforce the EU’s position, 
rather than rival it (Djiré, et al. 2016):   
 
“France has actively participated in the different negotiations between the 
protagonists of the Malian crisis. It has supported the electoral process and 
supports the monitoring and implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement. 
It supports Mali in different areas of socioeconomic and cultural development 
in Mali, both on a central level and a territorial and regional authority level” 
(19-20). 
 
Evidently, the French role and model in the Malian crisis has always been in tandem with 
the EU’s policies of helping build the peace in the region as well as restore democracy 
and human development (Théroux-Bénoni 2015; International Crisis Group 2013). To 
make sure that the operations of member states such as Operation Serval by France does 
not create a rival model to that of the EU, the Council agreed that  
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“EUTM Mali shall coordinate its activities with Member States’ bilateral 
activities in Mali, as well as with other international actors in the region, in 
particular the UN, the African Union (AU), ECOWAS and bilateral actors 
including the United States and Canada, and with key regional actors” 
(Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP 2013, Article 7 (4)). 
 
By requiring the member states to coordinate their bilateral operations with the EUTM 
operation, the Council essentially resolved a future inconsistency arising from individual 
member state operations. Additionally, “weekly meetings are held between the EU and 
the Member States to ensure the coherence of the various interventions” with the goal of 
ensuring that the Malian Armed Forces (MAF) were able to perform their missions in full 
(Djiré, et al. 2016, 25). 
 
However, it should be noted that the operation did not always have a high level of vertical 
consistency from the onset. In fact, “decision to deploy a CSDP mission in the Sahel was 
actively promoted by France, Italy and Spain, while Germany, Poland and the Nordic 
countries were more reluctant” (Venturi 2017, 7). This lack of coherence delayed the 
whole process until the threat posed by the insurgency became imminent. This is evident 
from the fact that even though “assessment missions were conducted already in 2010 in 
Mauritania, Niger and Mali, the agreement on a possible CSDP action in the region was 
reached only in December 2011 and the Council Decision authorising the deployment of 
the mission was adopted in March 2012” (Pirozzi 2013, 17). This has also cast doubt on 
the EU’s ability to function as a security actor in the region since its involvement may 
have only been a “visibility project” rather than a comprehensive approach to providing 
security in the region (Pirozzi 2013). In this sense, the fact that a lack of cohesion between 
member states at the EU level hindered an action until Mali was almost overrun by the 
insurgents shows the limits of the effectiveness of the EU as a security actor.  
 
 
6.1.2 Horizontal Cohesion 
 
Horizontal consistency on the other hand as discussed in chapter 3 refers to consistency 
between EU institutions as well as EU policies (Zwolski 2012, 75-76). The existence of 
horizontal consistency, then, implies that EU policies in various areas do not contradict 
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if not reinforce each other (Nuttall 2005). Policy contradictions indicate a low level of 
horizontal coherence. Analysing the case study within the framework of horizontal 
consistency, one could argue that the EU portrayed high level horizontal consistency in 
this particular case.  
 
Even though at a first glance, it might seem like the EU’s decision to intervene in a crisis 
in Africa contradicts with its policy of African ownership and responsibility, a careful 
look at the details of the mandate indicates otherwise. The capacity which the EU is 
operating in EUTM Mali does not go beyond training and advisory roles. The mission of 
the EU personnel in Sahel region has always been to equip the Malian army with the 
necessary skills and tactics in combatting the insurgents (EEAS 2019). In this regard, the 
EU only serves to capacitate the MAF in order to own and take responsibility of their 
national crisis. Another evidence of horizontal consistency is reflected by the EU’s 
commitment to security-development nexus (Venturi 2017). The deployment of a civilian 
operation to help deal with civilian issues such as policing, human rights and proper 
governance a year after EUTM Mali illustrates how the EU is following through with 
various complementary policies to realise its goals. The table below shows the amount of 
financial assistance which the EU has committed to addressing development issues in the 
Mali.  
 
Table 6.1 EU projects and programs funds in Sahel 2014-2020 
 
The EU’s commitment to tackling other issues in the region such as poverty and food 
security which can be major causes of conflict in the region is indeed an indicative of 
horizontal consistency within the EU (Djiré, et al. 2016, 23). In fact, Article 7 (1) of the 
Council decision 2013/34 stipulated that “the HR shall ensure the implementation of this 
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Decision and its consistency with the Union’s external action as a whole, including the 
Union’s development programmes” (Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP 2013). That is to 
say the EU from the onset of the deployment of mission had consistency in their priorities.  
At the institutional level, the Council in all its decisions it passed on Mali defined various 
codes for consistency and coordination. Council decision 2013/34 which launched the 
operation in Mali required “EUTM Mali to coordinate with Union CSDP mission in Niger 
(EUCAP SAHEL Niger) with a view to exploring possible synergies”. Moreover, to 
prevent institutional and bureaucratic confusions about the responsibilities of various EU 
institutions and actors within the operation, the Council clearly indicated the role of 
various EU instruments, as summarised in the table below. 
 
Table 6.2 Major EU instruments in Mali 
 
 
 
6.2 Capability 
 
 
As discussed earlier in chapter 3, the capability perspective is reinforced by the EU’s 
cohesion and consistency as the willingness of member states to supply assets for 
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operations depends on their level of support for the mission. This is reflected by the delay 
of the EU to deploy a mission until AQIM and MNLA had neared Bamako, the capital 
city (Pirozzi 2013). Perhaps the biggest obstacle the EU faces as a security actor today is 
the lack of an EU military. The EU has always had to depend on the military capabilities 
of its member states who have not always been keen to provide their men for EU 
operations. States have their own interests at heart (Rose 1998) and therefore do not 
readily volunteer their men unless they perceive a direct benefit. This has been discussed 
in the literature with the often conclusion that France has usually used the European 
Union to advance its agenda and “sphere of influence” on the African continent (Chafer 
and Cumming 2010; Martin 1995). Research has shown that France “selectively 
supported development and democratisation in Francophone Africa according to criteria 
pertaining more to her core foreign-policy interests in Africa than to ideological, 
legalistic, or humanitarian considerations” (Martin 1995, 1). In line with this thought, a 
more recent study by Chafer (2013) points out the fact that historical rivalry by France 
and the UK in Africa hindered cooperation between the actors which drove each of them 
to pursue their individual interests for several years. 
 
Efforts at a joint EU military seemed like a possibility in 1998 when French President 
Chirac and UK Prime Minister Blair agreed to a possible European army. In addition to 
an ideological (Europeanist and Atlanticist) difference that had made such a breakthrough 
unlikely, “Anglo-French relations in Africa had been characterized by rivalry since the 
beginning of the colonial period” (Chafer 2013, 235). In the Malian crisis, an unexpected 
turn of events manifested when the French President Hollande. sought UK’s contribution 
in Operation Serval. Prime Minister Cameron readily relinquished “two planes to 
transport troops and heavy equipment and subsequently agreed to provide at least 300 
troops in a noncombat role to support the French intervention” (Chafer 2013, 234). Chafer 
and Cumming (2010) have argued that the emerging convergence of the UK and France 
was a result of two important dynamics: one was that France was eager to show to NATO 
and the world that the EU was capable of conducting an EU-led operation; the second 
was that the UK wanted to “prove that (it) was still interested in developing a European 
defence capability” (1134). These dynamics consequently led to both France and the EU 
coordinating and providing personnel for the EUTM Mali mission. To put this in the 
context of cohesion, the transformation (or Europeanisation) in French and English 
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foreign policy to think in terms of Europe contributed to the EU’s ability to gather 
capabilities for the operations. 
 
In this case, the convergence of member states interests facilitated the mission since as 
the vertical consistency effectively translated into willingness to supply assets and men 
for the operation. Therefore, the EU is able gather force easily in cases where member 
states interests align. Studies have attributed the recent cooperation between the member 
states and willingness to provide military capability to the 1998 Saint-Malo declaration 
(Chafer and Cumming 2010). According to Chafer and Cumming (2010), Saint-Malo 
declaration was the breakthrough that facilitated cooperation between the UK and France 
which has paved way for effective EU missions, and with this cooperation came an 
increased level of coherence.  
 
 
6.3 (Internal) Authority 
 
 
The internal dimension of authority refers to an EU level legal framework that legitimized 
the operation. This is an aspect often undermined by the intergovernmental nature of the 
European Council. Since all CSDP/CFSP operations fall under the jurisdiction of the 
Council, arriving at a consensus is often difficult. Considering that each member state has 
a veto power at the Council, decisions can be easily blocked by a member state. 
Fortunately, the Council decision to deploy EUTM Mali was swift and smooth. The EU 
in this aspect was effective in that the national level politics did not serve as a hinderance 
to a consensus. On the contrary, the individual operations carried by member states, i.e. 
France, only served to support the EU’s mission (Djiré, et al. 2016).  
 
Essentially, the EU’s authority was not challenged by the member states as the decision 
at the EU level was coherent and consistent with individual state policies (Chafer and 
Cumming 2010, Djiré, et al. 2016). Member states such as Germany and Poland which 
were initially hesitant to support the mission later supported the mission which reinforced 
the EU’s authority (Venturi 2017, 7). This may be attributed to the fact that the crisis in 
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Mali had possible implications for all EU member states. First, stability in the region was 
in the economic and energy security interests of the EU. In this sense, it was easy to realise 
a convergence of interests. Second, the EU has often seen a threat of terrorism anywhere 
as a threat of terrorism in Europe. Without intervention, the region could easily fall into 
the preying hands of terrorist groups who could easily find their way to Europe through 
the Maghreb or even propagate radical ideologies in the already existing African 
immigrants in Europe. These two factors resulted in the harmonization of EU member 
state policies which saw the birth of the mission in Mali.  
 
 
6.4 (External) Authority 
 
 
Authority in the context of EU actorness can be simply put as “the legal competence to 
act” (Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Greiçevci 2011, 286). Authority therefore examines the 
constitutional framework that legalised the EU’s action in a particular security issue. 
Authority has both an internal and external dimension. The external dimension is 
discussed in this subsection, while a different subsection is allocated for the internal 
dimension of EU’s legal authority. In assessing EU’s security actorness, the question that 
arises in terms of authority is as follows: Under what (international) legal competence did 
the EUTM Mali operation act? 
 
Internationally, EU’s external legal authority as a security actor is supported by Articles 
52 and 53 of the UN charter. Article 52 permits the establishment of regional institutional 
arrangements to keep the peace of a region whereas article 53 requires that peace and 
security operations carried out by these regional organisations are subject to UNSC 
approval. Traditionally, the CSDP/CFSP civilian and military mission in Europe have 
been carried under the aforementioned legal frameworks of the UN Charter. In the Malian 
case however, the operation was beyond the territories of Europe. Hence, it required a 
new resolution by the UNSC to grant the EU the legal authority to deploy staff for the 
mission.  
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Specifically, UNSC resolution 2085 invited other regional and international organisations 
to help restore the peace in Mali and curb the threats posed by the insurgent groups. It 
 
“urged Member States, regional and international organizations to provide 
coordinated assistance, expertise, training, including on human rights and 
international humanitarian law, and capacity-building support to the Malian 
Defence and Security Forces, consistent with their domestic requirements, in 
order to restore the authority of the State of Mali over its entire national 
territory, to uphold the unity and territorial integrity of Mali and to reduce the 
threat posed by terrorist organizations and associated groups, further invites 
them to regularly inform the Secretariat of their contributions” (UNSC 2012c, 
4). 
 
The resolution further made a direct and welcoming reference to the EU’s planned 
mission of deploying staff to train the Malian military in coordination with AFISMA. The 
EU’s role in this sense was crucial in that the West African front, AFISMA, lacked the 
kind of resources provided by the EU’s military training mission. Looking at the EUTM 
Mali from this context then, it can be concluded that the EU’s role as a security actor was 
strengthened by the international legal framework.  
 
More importantly however is the instrumental role played by France at the UNSC that led 
to Council Resolution 2085, which served as an international legal foundation for the 
EUTM operation (Francis 2013).  
 
“France had maintained a consistent position on the crisis in Mali and used 
its political influence and leadership at the UN Security Council, the EU, the 
AU and ECOWAS to mobilise international support to resolve the conflict. 
Throughout the crisis France supported military intervention to prevent rebels 
and Islamists from taking over the whole of Mali, but preferred African forces 
to do the fighting” (Francis 2013, 5). 
 
It is apparent that despite France’s support of a military intervention in Mali and its 
unilateral pursuit of an international support from the UN, French policy did not stray 
away from the EU’s policy of African ownership, which reflects the level of consistency 
between the member states and the UN.  
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6.5 Recognition and Presence 
 
 
Recognition in the literal form can be understood from the perspective of other actors in 
the international system. It refers to the “acceptance of and interaction with an entity by 
others” (Jupille and Caporaso 1998, 214). In order for the EU to act effectively as security 
actor, its role as a security actor has to be recognised by other actors involved in the crisis. 
One factor that is closely interlinked with recognition is the EU’s presence. It is important 
that the EU’s presence is not imposed forcefully, but instead its presence should be 
through the impact it is able to make therefore making itself invaluable to Mali, the 
ECOWAS and the UN. In the current atmosphere of global politics, the conceptualisation 
of power has changed in that “…presence rather than rule, penetration rather than 
possession have become the important issues” (Hanrieder 1978, 1280). In line with this 
thought, presence has been quite succinctly defined as “the ability of the EU, by virtue of 
its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 22).  
 
In this sense, it is imperative that the EU does not force itself to be a security actor in the 
region but rather its actorness emerges from that the fact that the Sahel countries in fact 
recognise the EU as an actor capable of dealing with the security issues in the region. The 
EU has to battle the challenge of mistrust resulting from the legacy of EU countries being 
former colonial rulers of many African states. Hanrieder’s notions of “presence rather 
than rule” and “penetration rather than possession” are well reflected in the EU’s policies 
towards African countries, in this case Mali. The notion of African ownership as 
illustrates how the EU is shying away from acting as “rulers” or “possessors” in African 
politics. Instead, the EU in its previous security missions in other parts of Africa, that’s 
in Congo, Somalia, and South Sudan, served as an opportunity for the EU to penetrate 
security issues in the region thereby reflecting its value.  
 
One important aspect of presence is the fact that it takes precedence over the actor himself 
(Allen and Smith 1990). What this implies is that the presence of the EU does not solely 
depend on the EU but rather on the expectations of the Malian people. The Malian 
government consequently recognises the EU as a security actor based on the expectations 
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that the EU has the capabilities and resources, not forgetting the reputation of the EU in 
the eyes of the Malian government and people reflected by the EU’s past interactions in 
the region. Hence, “presence [can be] defined by a combination of factors: credentials 
and legitimacy, the capacity to act and mobilize resources, the place it occupies in the 
perceptions and expectations of policy makers” (Allen and Smith 1990, 21). Putting these 
factors together, the EU has gained recognition and reputation as a valuable security actor 
in the region which resulted in the Malian administration, the ECOWAS and the UN all 
reacting favourably towards the EU’s role as a security actor in the crisis. First, the UNSC 
resolution 2085 directly referred to the possible role that the EU could play in the crisis. 
Article 9 of the resolution “took note…of the planned deployment by the European Union 
of a military mission to Mali to provide military training and advice to the Malian Defence 
and Security Forces” (UNSC 2012c). Article 20 further “welcomed the willingness of the 
European Union to provide such financial support to AFISMA through the mobilization 
of the African Peace Facility” (UNSC 2012c). At the local level, the Malian public 
manifested their support for the mission, more specifically to the role of France. Hence, 
when French President Hollande visited Mali a few weeks after the intervention, “he was 
given a rapturous welcome and treated like a hero, in scenes reminiscent of President 
Sarkozy’s visit to Benghazi in Libya after the fall of the Qaddafi regime in 2011” (Francis 
2013, 6). This indicates that not only was the mandate recognised at the international 
level, but also the civilians also recognised the role of the European actors as security 
providers in the region.   
 
 
6.6 Autonomy and Opportunity 
 
 
Autonomy as an external criteria of the EU’s security actorness is conceptualised by the 
extent to which other actors in the international system limit the ability of the EU to act 
effectively (Greiçevci 2011). The EU’s leeway to act freely in accordance with its policies 
is either enforced by actors which support the EU or challenged by other global actors 
who may have rival policies. That is to say, opportunities/constraints in the global arena 
highly influence the EU’s capacity to act freely and effectively. Bretherton and Vogler 
(2006) have posit that “opportunity denotes the external environment of ideas and events 
— the context which frames and shapes EU action or inaction” (Bretherton and Vogler 
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2006, 22). In the scope of this study, the question concerning EU’s effectiveness in this 
case is: what factors constrained the EU in acting freely and what are the factors that 
challenged the EU’s autonomous actions?  
 
In the context of Africa, recent actors such as China and Russia are the main actors that 
limit the opportunities of the EU on the continent. China’s increasing involvement in 
Africa particularly reduces the EU’s opportunities in the region even though the EU 
remains the biggest trade partner of the region. Many researchers have however argued 
that China’s interests in Africa are confined to economy and energy security (Salameh 
1995, Tull 2006), two factors that lead to China not implementing political conditionality 
as does the European counterparts (Alden 2005). The absence of political conditionalities 
increases the appeasing nature of China to the numerous autocratic leaders in the region. 
 
In the realm of global security however, China has not been a major actor limiting the 
opportunities and autonomy of the EU. China has been almost non-existent in security 
missions in Africa. In the current MINUSMA mandate established by the UN resolution 
2423, China is completely absent in the contributing countries to the police patrol of 1,759 
personnel and a contribution of 396 men to the 13,010 military patrol (UN Missions 
2019). Neither China nor other actors involved in the Mali crisis have limited the 
autonomy of the EU to act efficiently. In fact, the role of the EU was welcomed by the 
UN, the ECOWAS and the Malian government. The Security Resolution 2085 which 
favourably mentioned the planned EU mission is evidential of the positive attitude of the 
UNSC towards the mission (UNSC 2012c). additionally, the direct request by the Malian 
government to the EU (Heisbourg 2013) contributed to EU’s autonomy since the Malian 
government was willing to cooperate with the European actors. The ECOWAS had 
neither the resources nor the ability to react rapidly to the issue and therefore had to 
welcome the European partners (International Crisis Group 2013). The UN as well 
needed some time to mobilise and deploy the MINUSMA and therefore had to welcome 
the efforts by the EU.  
 
EU has been successful in this regard as a result of its advocation for multilateralism. 
Indeed, in both global security strategies adopted by the EU in 2002 and 2016, the EU 
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reiterated its commitment to multilateralism in dealing with global security crises. Unlike 
other security actors such as the US who has embarked on military missions without a 
multilateral approval, the EU has often operated in line with multilateralism. This 
effectively enforces the EU’s autonomy and opportunities as it does not face major 
oppositions from other actors once it has deployed the mission. In the case of EUTM 
Mali, the EU member states at the UNSC, especially France, pushed for a multilateral 
approach which contributed to the autonomy of the EU in carrying out the operation. To 
revisit the question posed earlier, it can be concluded that no actors in the international 
arena significantly limited the EU’s autonomy to act effectively in the Malian crisis.  
 
 
6.7 (Non)Success of the Mission 
 
 
This section discusses the effectiveness of the EU mission based on the outcome of the 
operation. Considering that the operation is ongoing, analysis presented in this section 
looks at the outcomes that has been reached so far. To do so, this section examines the 
outcomes of the mission from two dimensions: short-term and long-term outcomes. The 
short-term analysis discusses the outcomes in the immediate period following the training 
mission while the long-term analysis discusses the developments until today. 
The short-term impact can be understood by looking at the main goals of the mission. As 
mentioned in chapter 4, the mission statement of the EU was to train and empower the 
Malian military so that they can keep the territorial integrity of the government. In 
essence, the EU mission aimed to increase the competence of the Malian security and 
government to effectively combat the armed insurgents that posed threat to the 
government (Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP 2013). As pointed out by Coolsaet, Biscop 
and Coelmont (2013), EU’s roles could be seen from two dimensions: a. training the 
Malian military and b. helping “establish a legitimate government in Bamako and inter-
Malian reconciliation” (3).  In this regard, the mission could be considered a success in 
the short run since the insurgent group were successfully driven out of Bamako to the 
outskirts of the country. Additionally, the Malian military gained several military 
trainings from the European counterparts. A presidential election in July 2013 and a run-
off in August restored democratic governance in the country with a smooth power 
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transition. Alas, such positive outcomes remained only at the state and institutional level 
as reports by HRW and Amnesty International indicate negative long-term outcomes on 
civilians.  
 
Report by Amnesty international indicates that the country has been subject to several 
state of emergencies due to continues instability. Additionally, the report indicates that 
several human rights infringements as well as humanitarian law violations by the military 
continue to undermine peace in the country  (Amnesty International 2018). Occasional 
attacks by armed groups also show that even though the MAF was successful in driving 
off the armed insurgents out of the capital, it has not been able to completely eradicate 
the threat to the civilians. The presence of armed forces in some towns has resulted in the 
shutting down of several 100 schools. According to the report, little progress has been 
made even though the Malian government has accepted recommendations “to ban female 
genital mutilation, protect children from recruitment by armed groups, and investigate 
extrajudicial executions” (Amnesty International 2018, 4). Similarly, report by the HRW 
highlight similar trend. Despite the opening of investigations to deals with violations by 
some of the military personnel, civilians have constantly become victims of violence 
while simultaneously rights of women and children is neglected (Human Rights Watch 
2018). These reports indicate that even though the EU played crucial roles in achieving 
the short-term goals of keeping the integrity of the Malian government, the threats posed 
by the insurgent groups to the Malian people continues to threaten the peace of the region.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
New threats emerging from the post-Cold War era has transformed the role of the EU in 
global security. The EU is determined an independent path of security actorness with its 
own voice and capabilities independent of NATO. In the current security environment, 
one region in which the EU has been visible in terms of security issues is Sub-Saharan 
Africa. While the region is not in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU, its distance 
can still pose a threat to the EU. In both the ESS (EEAS 2003) and the EUGS (EEAS 
2016), the EU mentions issues such as poverty, terrorism, health, and civil conflicts which 
are some of the major security issues facing some of the countries in this region. It comes 
as no surprise therefore that the EU has engaged in several civilian and military operations 
to enable keep the peace in the region.  
 
Traditionally, the relationship between the EU and the sub-Saharan Africa had been 
economic and development focused through preferential trade treatments. Under the 
framework of the Lomé convention and the Cotonou Agreement, EU’s relationship was 
underpinned by the motivation to help the region stand on its feet economically. 
Development policies dominated EU-Africa relationship from post-independence Africa 
in the 1960s to the early 2000s. The emergence of new security threats coinciding with 
the EU’s development of a security framework, CSDP, transformed this relationship to 
include security. As of today, about 50 percent of all CSDP missions carried by the EU 
has been in Sub-Saharan Africa, evidently indicating the importance of the region to 
European security. Under the CSDP, the EU has deployed missions to Somalia, Sudan, 
Chad, Niger, and some other African countries. However, the effectiveness of EU 
operations in Sub-Saharan African is less studied vis-à-vis its operations in other places 
like Kosovo and the Balkans. This thesis aims to bridge this gap by evaluating the role of 
the EU as a security actor in Mali.  
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Until the 1970s, the EU as an international actor was usually disregarded due to the 
dominance of realist theorists as Waltz (1959) who tend to focus more on states as the 
main actors in international politics. Additionally, the EU neither had the capability nor 
the will to be a global security actor. However, a study by Young (1972) has shown that 
the world has gradually moved towards a mixed-actor system in which regional 
organisations such as the EU could assume crucial roles in global actorness. Evidently, 
the EU has played pivotal roles in issues pertaining global warming and environment, 
migration, and world trade (Allen and Smith 1990; Delreux 2011; Groenleer and Schaik 
2007). In the light of this, this study has analysed the role of the EU as a global security 
actor in Africa. 
 
Using the EU military and civilian operation in Mali as a case study, this thesis has sought 
to understand how effective of an actor the EU is or isn’t in security issues in Africa. 
Some of the early questions that have emerged at the onset of this study is why the EU 
feels the need to maintain the peace in a region other than its own. Studies show that the 
EU advocates for peace in Africa because it fears radical Islamist groups in Africa may 
inspire the large African immigrant population in the EU (Olsen 2015). The EU has been 
a victim of several deadly attacks inspired by radical Islamists. Hence, the growth of 
radicalism anywhere in the world, especially in Africa the Sahel region, may inspire more 
attacks in Europe. Additionally, since the Sahel region is a source of uranium for some 
European countries, peace and stability in the region is a priority for these European 
countries. In an attempt to maintain the peace and keep European interests, the EU has 
carried out several operations in Africa. However, the question of whether these 
operations in Sub-Saharan Africa are successful was not very much explored. Using the 
case of Sahel Mali, this thesis has attempted to answer the question of how effective the 
EU has been as a security actor in Africa.  
 
The literature has used several criteria in assessing EU’s effectiveness as a global security 
actor. In chapter 3 of this thesis, I have outlined and discussed these criteria which I have 
categorised into external and internal dimension. In the external dimension, the literature 
has looked three main dimensions: recognition and presence; authority; autonomy and 
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opportunity. In the internal dimension, the three dimensions examined in the literature are 
cohesion, authority, and capability.  
 
Recognition and presence refer to the extent to which the EU was acknowledged by other 
actors as a security actor. Authority on the other hand refers to the international legal basis 
underpinning EU operations. The EU has often gained its external authority from the UN 
Charter and UNSC resolutions due to its desire to conform with multilateralism. 
Autonomy and opportunity on the other hand refers to the extent to which the EU could 
act freely without being limited by actions or policies of other security actors. The 
findings of this research show that in all of these external dimensions, the EU had high 
level of effectiveness in that, it had recognition from the Malian government, UN, and 
ECOWAS, its mission had an international legal base, and none of the other actors limited 
the EU’s autonomy. This is partly due to the high level of cohesion at the EU which 
resulted in a united front. At the UN, France strived on behalf of the EU to have the 
Security Council acknowledge the European mission. The coordination of EU and 
member state operations helped present the EU a unified and strong capable actor which 
contributed to the Malian government and ECOWAS welcoming the EU. In this case, 
EU’s effectiveness from the external dimension was impacted positively by its cohesion.  
 
On the internal dimensions, cohesion refers to the consistency between the EU and the 
member states as well as between several EU policies. Authority refers to the legal base 
granted by EU laws and resolutions, while capabilities refers to the security instruments 
and personnel available to the EU. In this dimension as well, the EU proved to be 
effective. Member states policies were consistent with the EU as several states 
contributed to the operation. Also, the mission was conducted in line with the EU’s policy 
of African ownership. The member states provided legal bases upon the which the 
mission was conducted, and the convergence of interest facilitated the gathering of 
personnel for the mission.  
 
However, the premise upon which this thesis rests is the most appropriate dimension to 
assess EU’s effectiveness is cohesion.  The empirical section, chapter 6, has shown that 
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the other factors such as authority, autonomy, and capabilities are highly interlinked with 
cohesion. The existence of vertical cohesion facilitates the ability of the EU to gather 
capabilities as well as act autonomously. This is demonstrated by the fact that the EU 
could not deploy a mission in the early stages of the crisis despite reports indicating that 
threats in the Sahel region were becoming worse. In the end, the mission could only be 
realised after vertical cohesion was realised. This also implied that members willingly 
granted the EU the authority to act. In sum, capabilities and authority could only be 
realised after there was vertical cohesion. At the EU level, there was also horizontal 
cohesion, the EU coordinated all policies and instruments in the Sahel region to foster 
what has been termed in the literature as security-development nexus, and/or a 
comprehensive approach to security. Also, the coordination of EU operations with 
individual member state operations in the region facilitated EU’s actorness. From the 
international front, France played the biggest role as the major driver of the EU’s interest 
in the Sahel region. It pushed for the support of the UNSC to pass resolutions that would 
legally allow the EU to act in the crisis. Despite France’s unilateral operation, it acted in 
accordance with EU’s policies rather than pursue separate policies.  
 
In essence, the EU mission in Mali can be considered a success in the short-term as it was 
able to achieve the goals it had set, thus to capacitate the Malian military through training 
to fight off the insurgent group that was marching towards the capital, and to help restore 
civilian government. In the long-term however, there are some issues that may require 
different strategy to battle. Amnesty International and HRW have both reported several 
incidences of armed violence on civilians by both the Malian military and remnants of 
the terrorist groups. These are some of the long-term consequences that the EU might 
need to readdress.  
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